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Due Process and the Non-Citizen:                                
A Revolution Reconsidered 
JOSEPH LANDAU 
In the pantheon of the Supreme Court’s procedural due process 
jurisprudence, commentators typically describe Mathews v. Eldridge—the 
canonical case balancing governmental interests and individual rights—as a low 
point for individual liberty and a retreat from the high-water mark of Goldberg v. 
Kelly. But the due process revolution, and Mathews in particular, has 
dramatically affected the status of non-citizens in a number of immigration and 
national security cases. Mathews’ transplantation to these areas has produced a 
body of decisions that are ushering in new rights protections and weakening 
doctrines of exceptionalism, for two reasons. First, Mathews requires an 
individuated inquiry into private interests that, when applied to cases involving the 
deportation, detention, and trials of foreign nationals, undermines the categorical 
inquiries into sovereignty, citizenship, and territoriality that defined more than a 
century of immigration and national security law. Second, Mathews often requires 
a judicial assessment of the merits of underlying policy, putting courts in the 
unique position of evaluating—and, at times, rejecting—congressional and 
administrative decisions that deny protections to foreign nationals. Courts 
engaging in due process balancing have begun to assert their own comparative 
expertise, and while the judiciary still frequently yields to government interests in 
these cases, the “Mathewsization” of immigration and national security has 
changed the judicial role with payoff for individual rights. Moreover, this payoff 
extends beyond the courts, for the coordinate branches, too, are experiencing a 
Mathewsization of sorts. In a world defined by fractious institutional power grabs, 
Mathews provides an unexpected mechanism for dialogue among coordinate 
institutions and a basis for inter-branch coordination.    
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Due Process and the Non-Citizen:                                
A Revolution Reconsidered 
JOSEPH LANDAU∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the pantheon of the Supreme Court’s procedural due process 
jurisprudence, commentators typically describe Mathews v. Eldridge1—the 
canonical case balancing governmental interests and individual rights—as 
a low point for individual liberty and a retreat from the high-water mark of 
Goldberg v. Kelly.2 On the conventional view, Mathews represents an ill-
fated and restrained turn in the articulation of a new doctrine of due 
process in which the Court prioritized utilitarian calculations and cost-
benefit analyses at the expense of deeper citizenship values such as dignity 
and equal participation.3  
                                                                                                                          
∗ Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. I would like to thank Samuel Bray, Connor Carroll, 
Rose Cuison-Villazor, Nestor Davidson, Erin Delaney, Melissa Fabi, Amanda Frost, Sam Issacharoff, 
Kevin Johnson, Sonia Katyal, Andrew Kent, Tom Lee, Stephen Legomsky, Ethan Leib, Michael Liroff, 
Peter Margulies, Jon Michaels, Joanna Rosenberg, Emily Rush, Jacob Sayward, Peter Schuck, and 
Margaret Taylor for their comments and suggestions. 
1 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
2 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for 
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 
U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 58 (1976) (describing the Mathews court as “[r]etreating from” the Court’s stance 
in Goldberg); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674 (2d ed. 1988); 
Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 197–98 (1991) (describing 
Goldberg as “the beginning of a brave new world” for due process rights); Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All 
Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 803 (1990) (arguing that Goldberg jurisprudence be “protected 
from” Mathews); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes 
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (arguing that Goldberg represents a 
“‘stronger,’ more meaningful opportunit[y]” to participate in the judicial process); Rebecca E. Zietlow, 
Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 
12 (1997) (“[I]n the subsequent case of Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court appeared to put aside the 
egalitarian, communitarian rationale of Goldberg. . . .”); cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Essay, The Due 
Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1981 (1996) (noting a “recognition 
[within Mathews] of the need to create pragmatically based limits on the scope of the new rights the 
Court had created”). 
3 See Mashaw, supra note 2, at 58 (arguing that “the absence in [Mathews] of traditionalist, 
dignitary, or egalitarian considerations . . . permitted the court to overlook questions of both fact and 
value,” providing “an inadequate guide for analysis because its neutrality leaves it empty of suggestive 
value perspectives”); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive 
Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 155 (1978) (rejecting Mathews’ 
“utilitarianism [a]s hostile to any theory of due process that treats individual dignity as a serious, 
operative societal value”); Zietlow, supra note 2, at 11–12 (asserting that Mathews undermined 
 
 882 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:879 
However, Mathews has activist features when applied to cases 
regarding the admission, expulsion, detention, and trial of foreign 
nationals.4 Courts applying Mathews to immigration and national security 
have produced surprisingly rights-affirming outcomes and a show of 
judicial confidence absent from conventional immigration and national 
security rulings, which traditionally accord extreme deference to the 
political branches.5 While the domestic-law due process cases of the 1970s 
seem an unlikely vehicle for a change in the constitutional rights of non-
citizens, the “Mathewsization” of immigration and national security is 
laying a new foundation of constitutional due process that has produced, 
and will likely continue to produce, greater and more concrete protections 
for foreign nationals.   
There are two basic reasons why Mathews is reshaping immigration 
and national security law. First, Mathews explicitly calls for a 
determination of the private interests at stake in a given case or context. As 
a result, courts applying the Mathews test have shifted their inquiries from 
group-based assessments of sovereignty, citizenship, and territoriality to 
more particularized interpretations of the circumstances of discrete cases. 
Second, Mathews requires that courts examine the costs and benefits of 
additional procedures, which invites—if not requires—a far more involved 
and active judicial role in assessing the merits of policies. Courts engaging 
in this balancing inquiry have begun to assert unexpected levels of 
comparative expertise greatly at odds with the exceptionalism defining 
more than a century of immigration and national security decisions.6  
These twin by-products of the due process revolution—an individuated 
inquiry on the one hand and an increased judicial independence on the 
other—have numerous implications for judicial review and the rule of law 
in matters regarding the admission, deportation, detention, and military 
                                                                                                                          
Goldberg’s “communitarian promise of participation to all citizens” guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
4 Foreign nationals are not precluded from seeking a range of statutory benefits under state and 
federal law, and they receive the same due process protections as citizens when accessing those 
benefits. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (invalidating state laws conditioning receipt 
of welfare benefits on possession of U.S. citizenship or durational residence within the United States). 
5 For purposes of this discussion, I will use the term “immigration law” to describe the cases 
governing the admission and the expulsion of foreign nationals, see Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 256, 
and Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional 
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990), and I will use “national security 
law” to refer to the body of law concerning the detention and trial of foreign non-state actors at 
Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere. These cases, for now, provide the most relevant context for the 
transplantation of due process norms to cases involving enemy foreign nationals.  
6 See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN 
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 178 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1392–94 (1999); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The 
Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 1981–89 (2013).  
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trials of non-citizens. While scholars of immigration and national security 
have previously noted ways that procedural devices can provide important 
mechanisms for the judicial recognition of foreign nationals’ substantive 
rights,7 this Article focuses on Mathews in general, and the intersection of 
immigration and national security in particular, to highlight a number of 
legal developments that span both fields. The complementarity of these 
developments yields substantial descriptive and normative implications for 
judicial review, tempering the harshness of the plenary power doctrine and 
providing a roadmap for the judiciary’s continued involvement in these 
sensitive areas of law.   
The unlikely payoff for individual rights occasioned by Mathews 
extends beyond the courts, for the coordinate branches, too, are 
experiencing a Mathewsization of sorts. The political branches have 
imported Mathews directly into policy considerations surrounding the use 
of force, and Mathews-style analysis finds its way into decisions regarding 
indefinite detention and deportation. While the judicial and political 
branches have invoked these analyses in different ways and to different 
ends, their shared reliance on Mathews highlights possibilities of dialogue 
and coordination that have yet to be explored in the literature.8 This 
collective branch convergence also tempers the critique, popular among 
some scholars, that open-textured frameworks such as Mathews undermine 
meaningful judicial review in exceptional areas of the law.9 In a world 
defined by fractious power grabs among the coordinate branches—
especially where immigration and national security are concerned10—the 
                                                                                                                          
7 Immigration scholars in particular have noted how procedural due process can serve as a 
mechanism “for avoiding the harshness of the plenary power doctrine.” Legomsky, supra note 5, at 
298. As Hiroshi Motomura has explained, procedural devices have functioned as “surrogate[s]” for 
substantive constitutional protections where foreign nationals are concerned. Hiroshi Motomura, The 
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1628 (1992). In addition, Motomura argues that constitutional doctrines from 
“mainstream” constitutional law have exerted a “gravitational force” that is revealed through 
procedural innovations in immigration. Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary 
Power, supra note 5, at 564.  
8 Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008) (describing the need for an “interpretive rule 
[that] facilitates a dialogue between Congress and the Court”).  
9 See Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 
507, 508–09 (2011) (arguing that “foreign affairs legalism”—the idea that “courts should impose more 
restrictions on the executive than they have in the past . . . rests on unproven and inaccurate 
assumptions about the capacities and motivations of courts and the executive, and it reflects confusion 
about the nature of international law”); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2009) (calling “[t]he aspiration to extend legality everywhere” misguided 
and “hopelessly utopian”). 
10 See, e.g., Mara Liasson, Republicans Criticize Obama’s Immigration Actions Ahead of 
Unveiling, NPR (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/11/19/365271500/republicans-criticize-
obamas-immigration-actions-ahead-of-unveiling; Samuel Smith, Obama ISIS Strategy Heavily 
Criticized by GOP, Senate Dems, Pentagon Official, CHRISTIAN POST (Sept. 13, 2014), 
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shared gravitation toward Mathews has produced convergence and even 
some harmony in laws regarding the rights of foreign nationals. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part II outlines the basic features of 
the due process revolution and its transplantation into the national security 
and immigration arenas. Part III describes how Mathews’ individuated 
inquiry has produced stronger constitutional protections that undermine 
conventional categorical approaches to immigration and national security 
decision-making. Part IV builds on that analysis by explaining how the 
courts’ increased role in balancing government and individual interests has 
resulted in renewed institutional checks on both legislative and executive 
branch policies. Part V considers the broader implications of these 
changes, the limitations of the Mathews revolution, and the role courts can 
continue to play in future cases at the intersection of individual liberty and 
executive power.  
II.  FROM CATEGORICALISM TO INDIVIDUATION 
A.  A Century of Judicial Exceptionalism 
For more than a century, the Supreme Court routinely relied on 
constitutional structure and political design—including the Constitution’s 
vesting of powers related to national security11 and immigration12 solely 
within the political branches—to reject the individual liberty claims of 
foreign nationals.13 The Court applied a categorical, group-based analysis 
grounded in status, territoriality, and sovereignty that generally resulted in 
the denial of the claims of foreign nationals challenging their detention, 
deportation, or military trial.  
The Supreme Court predicated its categorical inquiry on the belief that 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.christianpost.com/news/obama-isis-strategy-heavily-criticized-by-gop-senate-dems-
pentagon-official-126334/. 
11 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (celebrating the 
President’s “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of the federal government 
in the field of international relations”); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s 
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the 
Nations That Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 488 (2002) (“[T]he 
Constitution vests the President with the plenary authority, as Commander in Chief and the sole organ 
of the nation in its foreign relations, to use military force abroad, especially in response to grave 
national emergencies created by sudden, unforeseen attacks on the people and territory of the United 
States.”). 
12 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (noting the federal 
government’s inherent power and authority to exclude those it finds “dangerous to its peace and 
security”—and that such a “determination is conclusive upon the judiciary”); Anne Y. Lee, The 
Unfettered Executive: Is There an Inherent Presidential Power to Exclude Aliens?, 39 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 223, 231 (2005) (noting “a stand-alone, inherent federal power that granted Congress the 
power to control the nation’s borders and exclude particular aliens from entering the country,” which 
the Court derived from “the broad and largely undefined principles of national sovereignty”). 
13 See infra Parts III.A, III.B.  
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the political branches maintained expertise in immigration and national 
security and that courts should therefore not interfere with sensitive 
political branch judgments regarding national and border security. Courts 
believed the executive to be “institutionally best suited to initiate 
government action” on matters of national security, with the president 
uniquely situated to “take on degrees of speed, secrecy, flexibility, and 
efficiency that no other governmental institution can match.”14 The Court’s 
self-imposed plenary power doctrine reduced (if not eliminated) any role in 
interpreting substantive immigration policy. Within immigration, no less 
than national security, “[t]he rhetoric of judicial deference . . . was striking 
in that courts almost invariably meant what they said.”15 
Recently, however, courts have substituted the categorical, group-
based analysis with a more individuated framework that requires a more 
involved judicial role in assessing both the government’s claimed need for 
border control and national security and the foreign national’s unique 
liberty interests and overall circumstances. These twin developments—an 
individuated inquiry on the one hand and enhanced role for judicial 
consideration of policy on the other—have occurred in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s application of Mathews v. Eldridge to core national 
security and immigration matters. The Mathewsization of immigration and 
national security constitutes a striking development and arguably a new 
phase in the due process revolution. The Supreme Court’s application of 
Mathews and subsequent developments have undermined much of the 
exceptionalism that defined more than a century of prior immigration and 
national security rulings.16 
The doctrinal shifts wrought by Mathews are apparent within a 
growing number of recent Court decisions in which the Supreme Court has 
narrowly interpreted congressional statutes stripping the federal courts of 
jurisdiction;17 imposed limits on the amount of time that foreign nationals 
                                                                                                                          
14 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER 
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 118–19 (1990); see also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing 
Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1176 (2007) (making the claim that “courts should 
generally defer to the executive on the ground that resolving ambiguities requires judgments of policy 
and principle, and the foreign policy expertise of the executive places it in the best position to make 
those judgments”). 
15 Peter J. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1984).   
16 For an analysis of how the Supreme Court’s recent immigration decisions have departed from 
the concept of immigration exceptionalism, see Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 
2009-13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 67 OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 
2015) (on file with author); id. at 12 (noting that “the Court in effect has to a large extent continued to 
bring U.S. immigration law into the legal mainstream” and “has slowly but surely moved away from 
anything that might reasonably be characterized as immigration exceptionalism”). 
17 See, e.g., Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 418 (2009) (holding that a statutory provision sharply 
restricting injunctive relief did not apply to stays of removal pending judicial review); Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 724–25, 728 (2008) (applying the Constitution’s Suspension Clause to 
Guantánamo Bay and striking down a congressional statute that stripped federal courts of statutory 
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can be detained;18 narrowed the meaning and scope of Chevron19 deference 
in agency interpretations of Supreme Court doctrine20 or ignored Chevron 
altogether;21 and rejected or narrowed agency-created procedures that, with 
Congress’s blessing, limited or foreclosed procedural rights of foreign-
nationals.22 The Court has applied Mathews in some of these cases and 
built upon that due process foundation in others. Accordingly, while the 
transplantation of Mathews has served different ends on different 
occasions, the cases have generally led the way to more substantial 
protections for individuals who otherwise lack well-established claims to 
constitutional rights.  
Because these emerging constitutional protections remain inchoate and 
poorly defined,23 scholars often remark in the same breath that the Court’s 
recent rulings exemplify both the vanguard and rearguard of legal change. 
In the national security context, for example, David Cole sees the recent 
Supreme Court cases as both “quite limited” and an indication that the 
“rule of law . . . proved far more resilient than many would have 
                                                                                                                          
habeas jurisdiction at Guantánamo); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466 (2004) (interpreting the federal 
habeas corpus statute to apply to suits by foreign nationals at Guantánamo Bay); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 309–10 (2001) (narrowly interpreting jurisdiction-limiting provisions of immigration statutes 
and permitting suit by foreign nationals to proceed in habeas corpus). 
18 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001) (interpreting an immigration statute to 
incorporate “reasonabl[e]” limits on post-removal-order detention); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (upholding the executive’s “authority to detain for the duration of the relevant 
conflict” but noting that “[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of 
the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel”). 
19 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
20 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 522–23 (2009) (rejecting an agency’s interpretation of an 
immigration statute that would preclude asylum relief to those who persecuted others under duress).   
21 See Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1128–29 (finding it “significant” that courts deciding national 
security cases after 9/11 “often do not so much as advert to Chevron”); id. at 1128 (stating that the 
Supreme Court decided “issues of statutory authorization (in Hamdi [v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004),]) and statutory prohibition (in Hamdan [v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006),]) without offering 
direct instruction on the relevance of Chevron”). 
22 Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 233, 235 (2010) (drawing a distinction between discretion to 
grant or deny motions to reopen as conferred by a regulation versus by statute, and holding that Board 
of Immigration Appeals denials of motions to reopen are still subject to judicial review); Dada v. 
Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 2 (2008) (allowing foreign nationals to unilaterally withdraw a petition for 
voluntary departure, prior to the expiration of the departure period, to protect the right to pursue a 
motion to reopen); cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 788–89 (holding that even if the D.C. Circuit had a 
broad mandate to consider relevant exculpatory evidence under the Detainee Treatment Act, DTA 
§ 1005(e)(2)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 2742, the Act’s judicial review provisions still presented an inadequate 
substitute for habeas corpus).   
23 See Legomsky, supra note 5 (calling for the Court to abandon the plenary power doctrine in 
immigration); see also Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1013, 1029, 1092 (lamenting that the Supreme Court’s post-9/11 decisions leave “the final, 
substantive outcome of the cases at bar uncertain” and “resulted in a great deal of process, and not 
much justice”). 
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predicted.”24 Jenny Martinez points out that while the post-9/11 national 
security decisions “resulted in a great deal of process, and not much 
justice,”25 they also demonstrated “in some sense [that] the system 
‘worked.’”26 Discussing recent immigration cases, Kevin Johnson reports 
both the “good news . . . that the Court is engaging in meaningful review of 
agency decisions and . . . not blindly deferring to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals” and the bad news that courts have failed to “engage in more 
exacting judicial review of agency removal decisions.”27  
These varied responses reflect a deeper tension within both national 
security and immigration jurisprudence that is still working its way through 
the courts. On the one hand, recent Supreme Court cases have not 
explicitly undermined the basic structural model of constitutional decision-
making in these areas or the doctrine of plenary political-branch power. 
Nonetheless, the Court has not stood by these precedents either. Instead, 
the law inside the federal courts appears to be more open-textured, with the 
courts often citing Mathews as mandating a multi-factored test that, when 
applied to individual cases, creates more rights-affirming outcomes. Across 
these cases, one finds sharper judicial inquiries of actual policy combined 
with waning levels of adherence to the exceptionalism that previously 
defined national security and immigration. In both contexts, Mathews is a 
critical part of that shift.  
B.  The Due Process Revolution from Goldberg to Mathews 
The due process revolution is commonly attributed to Goldberg v. 
Kelly,28 which established as a threshold matter that constitutional due 
process protections apply to a range of entitlements that had previously 
seemed beyond the reach of constitutional protections to “life, liberty, or 
property.”29 The Supreme Court had traditionally reserved due process 
protections to “the fruits of an individual’s labor, such as money, a house, 
or a license to practice law, as well as forms of liberty recognized in the 
Bill of Rights.”30 Rejecting the sharp distinction between protected “rights” 
                                                                                                                          
24 David Cole, After September 11: What We Still Don’t Know, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 29, 2011, 
at 27, 28. 
25 Martinez, supra note 23, at 1092. 
26 See id. at 1038 (noting that, after Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), Padilla eventually 
received a lawyer and a jury trial). 
27 Kevin Johnson, The Supreme Court’s Immigration Decisions in the 2011 Term (Sans Arizona 
v. United States), IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (May 23, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
immigration/2012/05/the-supreme-courts-immigration-decisions-in-the-2011-term-sans-arizona-v-
united-states.html. 
28 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Charles Reich is credited as the forerunner to this movement through the 
publication of two seminal articles in the Yale Law Journal, both of which were cited by the Court in 
Goldberg. See id. at 262 n.8; see also Pierce, supra note 2, at 1974–76. 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267–71.  
30 Pierce, supra note 2, at 1974. 
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and unprotected “privileges,”31 the Goldberg Court extended due process 
protections to statutory welfare benefits, broadening the constitutional 
framework to require that the government provide welfare recipients with 
an evidentiary hearing prior to termination.32   
Commentators understand Goldberg to have unleashed “a due process 
explosion in which the Court . . . carried the hearing requirement from one 
new area of government action to another.”33 As Judge Friendly noted a 
few years after Goldberg, “[t]he trend in one area after another [was] to 
say, ‘If there, why not here?’”34 Indeed, after Goldberg, the Supreme Court 
extended the new due process framework to numerous contexts—including 
government employment,35 public schools,36 prisons,37 utilities,38 and the 
consumption of alcohol39—while refusing to do so in a smaller number of 
cases.40 While Goldberg required the agency to provide a welfare recipient 
with a pre-termination hearing before terminating benefits,41 subsequent 
case results restricted the amount of process due. As courts became 
“inundated . . . with claims of procedural deprivation,”42 the required 
procedures became less demanding. Critics assailed these restrained 
                                                                                                                          
31 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 584 (1972) (noting that Goldberg and its 
progeny “reject[ed] the wooden distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘privileges’”). 
32 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262, 267–68. 
33 Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975). 
34 Id. at 1300.  
35 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598, 602–03 (1972) (extending due process rights to a 
non-tenured college professor who, upon being fired from a junior college, alleged that the decision 
was based upon the exercise of his First Amendment rights). 
36 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (extending constitutional due process protections 
to students facing temporary suspension from public school). 
37 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 596, 600–01 (1974) (applying due process to prison 
inmates challenging procedures used in imposing a loss of their good-time credits). 
38 See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19–22 (1978) (finding that a 
company violated a customer’s due process rights by not providing the customer notice and opportunity 
to appeal billing errors). 
39 See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 435, 437, 439 (1971) (holding unconstitutional 
a Wisconsin statute that authorized liquor stores to post, without prior notice or hearing, the names of 
individuals to whom alcoholic beverages should not be sold).    
40 In Arnett v. Kennedy, the Court refused to expand constitutional due process protections to the 
for-cause firing of a tenured government employee, upholding the sufficiency of procedures already in 
place. 416 U.S. 134, 157–58 (1974); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (ruling 
that the due process clause did not require notice and a hearing prior to the imposition of corporal 
punishment under Florida statute); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697, 711–12 (1976) (ruling that a 
reputational injury suffered by an individual identified as an “active shoplifter” did not, in and of itself, 
amount to a violation of procedural due process); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578–79 (1972) 
(refusing to extend due process to a non-tenured university professor at a state university who 
challenged his employer’s decision not to rehire him for a second term).   
41 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. Goldberg required timely and specific notice, opportunity to make 
an oral presentation of evidence and cross-examine the government’s witnesses, the assistance of 
counsel, and a neutral fact-finder that provides the reasons for his decision and points to the evidence 
that led to that ruling. Id. at 267–71.   
42 See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 9 (1985).    
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procedures as an erosion of Goldberg’s safeguarding of Article III norms.43 
Mathews v. Eldridge, decided only five years after Goldberg, became 
the embodiment of the Court’s more relaxed stance toward procedural 
regularity. Mathews held that the Social Security agency’s truncated 
procedures for terminating benefits44—including a pre-deprivation written 
hearing but no trial until after benefits were terminated—satisfied due 
process.45 To support that outcome, Mathews adduced a three-part 
balancing test, weighing (1) the individual’s interest at stake; (2) a cost-
benefit analysis of additional procedures; and (3) the government’s 
interest.46 While this multi-pronged test was consistent with the language 
in a number of pre-Mathews cases—including Goldberg47—the two cases 
seemed to posit two very different due process inquiries. Goldberg 
considered the threshold question whether due process applied at all;48 
Mathews, by contrast, accepted the premise that due process protections 
obtained and asked instead how courts should balance private interests in 
light of the government’s needs.49 While Mathews drew criticism from 
scholars who viewed the decision as insufficiently protective of procedural 
rights,50 it accepted Goldberg’s basic premise that some kind of process 
                                                                                                                          
43 See, e.g., Zietlow, supra note 2, at 12 (arguing that the Court’s approach after Goldberg 
“limited the ability of the due process revolution to better the lives of the poor”).  
44 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340, 343 (1976). 
45 Id. at 345–46, 349 (holding that the administrative procedures for “disability-benefits-
entitlement assessment” were adequate and “fully comport[ed] with due process”). That process 
afforded the beneficiary a medical examination, access to reports of examining physicians, and an 
opportunity to provide a written statement in response to a doctor’s determination that benefits were no 
longer appropriate. Id.  
46 The test considers,  
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail. 
Id. at 335. 
47 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (noting that the scope of procedural due 
process “depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the 
governmental interest in summary adjudication”); id. (noting that the “due process [inquiry] may 
require under any given set of circumstances . . . a determination of the precise nature of the 
government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental 
action”). 
48 Id. at 260 (“The constitutional issue to be decided . . . is the narrow one whether the Due 
Process Clause requires that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of 
benefits.”). 
49 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (“At some point the benefit of [a particular procedural 
safeguard] . . . may be outweighed by the cost.”). 
50 See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 674 (explaining that the Mathews approach “not only overlooks the 
unquantifiable human interest in receiving decent treatment, but also provides the Court a facile means 
to justify the most cursory procedures by altering the relative weights to be accorded each of the three 
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was required—a rule that, if extended to immigration and national security, 
could have dramatic effects in those cases. Thus, even as commentators 
contrasted Goldberg and Mathews, hailing the former’s “promise of 
substantive justice and equality” while lamenting the latter’s elimination of 
an “egalitarian, communitarian rationale,”51 the transplantation of 
constitutional procedure to cases involving the rights of non-citizens would 
expand the due process revolution in critical ways. 
C.  Mathews’ Transplantation to Immigration and National Security 
While the due process revolution applied to a range of different 
domestic contexts, its constitutional foundations and protections seemingly 
had no application to immigration or national security. The judicially 
created plenary power doctrine undermined the idea of meaningful due 
process protections for foreign nationals in immigration exclusion 
proceedings as well as virtually all national security matters.52 The 
prevailing doctrines of exceptionalism—couched in formal considerations 
of status, territoriality, or sovereignty—were largely indifferent to the 
equities of the individual cases at hand. A foreign national’s connections to 
the United States or citizen family members, military service, or overall 
good moral character were irrelevant in many cases because foreign 
nationals held beyond U.S. shores lacked access to U.S. courts, preventing 
them from challenging their confinement, exclusion, or the process by 
which they were convicted overseas.53 As the Supreme Court would 
famously declare, “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it 
is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”54  
A decade after Goldberg, however, the Supreme Court transplanted 
                                                                                                                          
factors”); Farina, supra note 2, at 189 (calling the Supreme Court’s due process cases “a pathological 
combination of ineffectualness and destructiveness”); Fiss, supra note 2, at 793–94 (contrasting 
Goldberg’s “commit[ment] to procedural fairness” with Mathews’ “purely instrumental” approach that 
undermined important societal values); White, supra note 2, at 2–3 & n.3 (recounting the scholarly 
debate regarding the different visions of procedural justice as found in Goldberg and Mathews); 
Zietlow, supra note 2, at 12 (describing Mathews as part of a series of “significant limitation[s]” placed 
on the idea of due process articulated in Goldberg).    
51 See, e.g., Zietlow, supra note 2, at 12 (comparing the strides of Goldberg to the retreat of 
Mathews away from a communitarian view of due process). 
52 Compare Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and 
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 162 (2002) 
(“[T]he United States regularly maintains, and the courts frequently agree, that federal immigration 
laws should be subject to little or no judicial review . . . .”), with id. at 5, 7 (explaining that the Supreme 
Court has generally endorsed the idea that the government’s “external powers [were] largely isolated 
from judicial review” and that the government enjoys “relatively unlimited federal authority over 
foreign affairs”). The Plenary Power doctrine is discussed in the context of immigration, infra Part III. 
A, and national security, infra Part III.B. 
53 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765–66, 781 (1950) (holding that foreign nationals 
held and tried overseas had no right to seek a writ of habeas corpus).   
54 United States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
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Mathews’ core balancing test to cases of removal55 and, two decades after 
that, to the question of habeas access for Guantánamo detainees and the 
judicial review of their status hearings.56 Across all of these cases, the 
importation of Mathews required a level of judicial involvement that 
generally produced more—not less—process for foreign nationals 
challenging executive action. Moreover, Mathews appeared to take for 
granted the threshold Goldberg inquiry of whether constitutional due 
process applied in the first place. The Supreme Court held—sometimes 
explicitly, though usually implicitly—that the Constitution applied (at least 
to some degree) in cases challenging the government’s effort to deport, 
detain, or try non-citizens.57 By invoking Mathews, the Court sidestepped 
the threshold analysis of territoriality, sovereignty, and citizenship that had 
defined prior cases and instead outlined a broad range of factors, including 
the non-citizen’s stake in the process and a particularized inquiry into his 
or her circumstances. Through this balancing inquiry, courts began to 
sweep in a number of enhanced liberty protections that seemed impossible 
under the plenary power doctrine. In short, Mathews unleashed the 
possibility of a more serious rights doctrine for foreign nationals than the 
Court had previously recognized.   
While immigration and national security scholars have noted how 
courts have placed procedural devices in the service of constitutional 
protections that the plenary power doctrine seems to prohibit, less attention 
has been paid to Mathews and its unique effects on immigration and 
national security law. In the immigration context, Stephen Legomsky has 
discussed how procedural due process doctrine has at times been 
“fundamentally inconsistent with the actual results of the Supreme Court’s 
plenary power decisions.”58 Although the due process doctrine has not 
been applied consistently across all cases,59 it nonetheless reveals the 
judiciary’s “uneas[iness] over the concept of plenary Congressional 
power.”60 Hiroshi Motomura also has explored how courts use procedural 
law as a replacement for constitutional protections that the plenary power 
doctrine otherwise prohibits.61 In the realm of immigration law, 
constitutional values have exerted a special kind of gravitational force,62 
revealing “phantom norms” that link mainstream constitutional law with 
                                                                                                                          
55 See infra Part III.C  (discussing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)). 
56 See infra Part III.D (discussing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)). 
57 See infra Parts III.C, III.D.  
58 See Legomsky, supra note 5, at 298.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 296. 
61 Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law, supra note 7, at 1656. 
62 Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power, supra note 5, at 564 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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statutory and regulatory interpretations of immigration law.63 In that sense, 
procedural rulings have been a surrogate for substantive rulings that the 
classical doctrines would not allow.64   
In the national security context, Richard Fallon has noted how courts 
after 9/11 ruled on procedural fairness questions, an arena in which they 
naturally feel they have greater competence and expertise compared to 
substantive rulings.65 As he observes, “on a deeply divided Court, some of 
the Justices appear to have believed that the domain within which they can 
most confidently displace executive with judicial judgment is that of 
procedural fairness.”66 Other scholars have discussed the post-9/11 judicial 
landscape as one defined by procedural interpretations in which 
“[i]ncremental and marginal change through judicial review [was] best-
suited to protect the constitutional order.”67 
Yet there remain a number of connections between immigration and 
national security—including the Mathewsization of both fields—that 
warrant exploring them in tandem. The Supreme Court has routinely noted 
the national security underpinnings of its immigration-law doctrines,68 
often citing the Court’s “general reluctance to interfere with the conduct of 
foreign relations.”69 Moreover, both fields frequently operate through 
                                                                                                                          
63 Id. at 567–75. 
64 Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law, supra note 7, at 1628. 
65 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay 
on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 392 (2010). Fallon argues that “the Court’s 
War on Terror habeas decisions manifest a far greater willingness to rule for petitioners on grounds of 
procedure than of substance. . . .” Id. at 395. See generally Martinez, supra note 23. I have also argued 
that the post-9/11 decisions put procedural devices to “surprisingly ‘muscular’ uses” and that post-9/11 
decisions “illustrate a rare but critical assertion of procedural law where the political branches fail to 
legislate or properly implement substantive law.” See Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: 
Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 663 (2009). 
66 Fallon, supra note 65, at 395. 
67 Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 447 (2011). 
68 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705–06 (1893) (quoting Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604, 606 (1889)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that 
the United States is invested with powers which can be “invoked for the maintenance of its absolute 
independence and security throughout its entire territory,” and that “preserv[ing] its independence, and 
giv[ing] security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation”); 
Cleveland, supra note 52, at 157–58 (“The foreign affairs and national security implications of 
immigration were a primary justification for the Court’s abdication of ordinary constitutional analysis 
in this area. The Court repeatedly portrayed Congress’s control over admission and expulsion of aliens 
as so exclusive as to completely prohibit review by the courts.”); Legomsky, supra note 5, at 281 
(noting that substantive immigration policy questions often implicate values such as the balance 
between national security and civil rights). 
69 Legomsky, supra note 5, at 261. Legomsky also criticizes how “[t]he Court’s blanket technique 
of mechanically labeling immigration decisions as so ensconced in foreign policy that constitutional 
review is improper has precluded consideration of whether foreign affairs were actually affected” and 
favors an approach that would “reserve the judicial deference for the special case in which the court 
concludes, after a realistic appraisal, that applying the normal standards of review would interfere with 
the conduct of foreign policy.” Id. at 262–63. 
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exceptional court processes—immigration courts or military tribunals—
that create peculiar conditions for judicial review of the particular 
decisions, especially in the wake of repeated congressional efforts to 
constrain federal court jurisdiction in these areas.70 Finally, both fields test 
institutional allocations of authority in the context of individual due 
process claims, with Mathews producing surprisingly rights-affirming 
outcomes in a number of cases.71 
Before turning to Mathews and its effects on immigration and national 
security, a few caveats are in order. First, while Mathews has led to a more 
serious engagement with the rights of foreign nationals in a number of 
contexts, its effects should not be overstated. To be clear, the Supreme 
Court has not articulated bright-line constitutional protections for foreign 
nationals in its recent decisions and on some occasions has supported 
policies and procedures that sharply limit a foreign national’s procedural 
and substantive rights.72 Thus, numerous immigration and national security 
policies remain formally and functionally unreviewable,73 and, 
notwithstanding Mathews’ important innovations, courts continue to 
apply—or at least pay lip service to—many of its ordinary deference 
doctrines. Mathews should therefore be understood as merely one step, 
albeit a critical one, in a longer progression of the vindication of the rights 
of foreign nationals. 
Mathews’ role in the collapse of categorical distinctions between 
citizens and non-citizens has also produced a diminishment of protections 
                                                                                                                          
70 See infra Parts IV.A–B (noting that in the context of national security, due process analyses 
have been a qualitative institutional check and that, in the immigration context, due process has been 
used as a check against congressional overreach and to limit the authority of immigration judges and 
the Board of Immigration Appeals); see also Robert M. Chesney, Panel Report: Beyond Article III 
Courts: Military Tribunals, Status Review Tribunals, and Immigration Courts, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L., 
POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 27, 27 (2006) (discussing the tension between national security and procedural 
fairness in the context of military tribunals, status review tribunals, and immigration courts). 
71 See infra Part IV.C (discussing how individuated analyses in immigration have promoted 
foreign nationals’ rights). 
72 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489–92 (1999) (citing 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985)) (upholding broad executive branch enforcement 
discretion despite claims that prosecutorial discretion was used in a discriminatory manner); Mathews 
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69, 78, 87 (1976) (upholding restrictive federal residency classifications that 
denied certain non-citizens supplemental medical insurance benefits based on a “legitimate distinction” 
between citizens and non-citizens); Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory 
Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 364 (2014) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517, 
530–531 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001)) (“In the 2001 decision Zadvydas v. 
Davis, the Court avoided a due process problem by construing the statute governing detention of 
individuals with final orders of removal to permit detention only so long as removal was reasonably 
foreseeable, presumptively for no longer than six months. Two years later, in . . . Demore v. Kim, the 
Court found no due process violation where a lawful permanent resident in removal proceedings . . . 
was mandatorily detained for six months without a bond hearing.”).  
73 See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON & BERNARD TRUJILLO, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE U.S.-
MEXICO BORDER 97 (2011) (noting the non-reviewability of consular officer decisions). 
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in at least some cases. For example, when the Court applied Mathews to 
the case of U.S. citizens suspected of ties to terrorism in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld,74 it rejected the more rights-affirming, bright-line test requiring 
that Hamdi receive ordinary criminal procedure protections.75 
Commentators have thus criticized the Hamdi plurality for ushering in a 
reduction of procedural protections, at least where U.S. citizens are 
concerned. As Philip Hamburger has argued, Hamdi exemplifies how “the 
Supreme Court’s expansive vision of access to rights has costs not only for 
safety but also for civil liberty.”76 By “assum[ing] that a wide array of 
prisoners of war might have rights to judicial process . . . [t]he very breadth 
of access to the right thus seemed to require that its definition be 
diminished.”77 The convergence of national security doctrines for citizens 
and non-citizens thus poses a threat to civil liberties if the Mathews 
balancing test winds up supplanting formal rights regimes.78 Still, the 
Court’s expansion of the Mathews framework to immigration and national 
security has produced important checks against political branch overreach. 
Across both fields, the Court has applied individuated and multi-pronged 
frameworks (including but not limited to Mathews) as a mechanism for 
dialogue with the political branches—not so much to overrule them, but 
rather to mark the boundaries in which all three branches can operate most 
effectively. 
III. THE MATHEWSIZATION OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
For some time, judicial review of core immigration and national 
security decisions occurred within a formal, group-based account of the 
relationship between foreign nationals and the federal government. Court 
rulings emphasized categorical questions of territoriality, citizenship, and 
sovereignty to resolve whether non-citizens could claim the law’s 
                                                                                                                          
74 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
75 See id. at 528–29, 535 (2004) (applying the test for balancing the competing interests of the 
government and a citizen’s due process rights articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 
(1976), and finding it “inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting” to provide Hamdi with “the full 
protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings”); cf. id. at 541 (Souter, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment) (agreeing that due process 
protections must be afforded to Hamdi to challenge his detention and designation as an enemy 
combatant but disagreeing that Hamdi’s detention was authorized under a congressional joint resolution 
to use force against those responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks). 
76 Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1831 (2009). 
77 Id.  
78 Andrew Kent has noted other ways in which national security doctrines applicable to citizens 
and non-citizens have converged. See Andrew Kent, The Past and Future of Individual Rights 
Protection in National Security: Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging Domains, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with author) (observing that, in the wake of 9/11, the U.S. 
government has applied to citizens rules regarding the blocking and seizing of property that it 
previously applied to non-citizens).  
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protection. Under this traditional analysis, the Court’s self-imposed plenary 
power doctrine generally displaced meaningful judicial review with broad 
political branch power over immigration and national security.79 While the 
Constitution afforded some protection to foreign nationals who had entered 
the United States,80 the plenary power doctrine left the contours of those 
protections limited and uncertain.81   
A.  Categorical Approaches in Immigration  
1.  Early Cases 
The plenary power doctrine is frequently attributed to Chae Chan Ping 
                                                                                                                          
79 In some decisions, the Court invoked logic and language reminiscent of the political question 
doctrine. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(“Though . . . this country has traditionally welcomed aliens to come to its shores, it has done so 
exclusively as a matter of political outlook . . . . This policy has been a political policy, belonging to the 
political branch of the Government wholly outside the concern and the competence of the Judiciary.”); 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712 (1893) (“[I]t behooves the court to be careful that it 
does not undertake to pass upon political questions, the final decision of which has been committed by 
the constitution to the other departments of the government.”). However, whereas the political question 
doctrine categorizes some conflicts as non-justiciable because of Article III limitations, the plenary 
power doctrine has left at least some room for judicial review. The analogy is thus incomplete without 
clearer boundaries for plenary powers.   
The Court has also pointed to a tradition of judicial deference to the political branches on matters 
with sensitive foreign policy implications to justify immigration plenary powers. See, e.g., Harisiades, 
342 U.S. at 596–97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he determination of a selective and exclusionary 
immigration policy was . . . solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power 
of this Court to control.”). That approach is consonant with a conception of plenary power that grants 
the political branches very broad discretion, but ultimately does allow for some constitutional 
limitations and judicial review. Finally, in its most expansive conception of plenary powers, the Court 
has described the political branches’ power over immigration as extra-constitutional and inherent in 
sovereignty. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“The 
exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so . . . is inherent in the 
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.”); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889) (“Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of 
every independent nation. . . . If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the 
control of another power.”). This account admits no power for judicial review at all.   
80 See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (“[A]n alien who has entered the 
country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although 
alleged to be illegally here [cannot] be taken into custody and deported without [receiving] all 
opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States.”). 
81 See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 5, at 257 (“In the typical case, the governmental organ whose 
power over immigration is held to be plenary is Congress. Occasionally, however, the doctrine has 
effectively been extended to cover action of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as well.” 
(citation omitted)); see also Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power, supra note 
5, at 547 (“[I]n general the [plenary power] doctrine declares that Congress and the executive branch 
have broad and often exclusive authority over immigration decisions.”); cf. Adam B. Cox & Cristina 
M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 462 (2009) (arguing that a 
number of examples throughout history of back-end immigration screening by the President “provide[] 
provocative evidence that the possibility of inherent executive authority over migration has existed in 
practice and is not limited to a few old Supreme Court opinions”). 
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v. United States,82 in which the Court announced an inherent sovereign 
power to regulate immigration and upheld the power of Congress to 
exclude foreign nationals.83 The case concerned the exclusion of a Chinese 
immigrant returning to the United States after a trip abroad.84 The 
petitioner had been a lawful U.S. resident for over a decade and, upon 
leaving the country, obtained a certificate for reentry pursuant to then-valid 
law.85 Before he returned, however, Congress declared all such certificates 
void and barred all Chinese migrants from entry.86 The petitioner 
challenged that law, but the Court ultimately upheld it.87 The case was set 
against the backdrop of decades of growing anti-Chinese sentiment 
throughout the United States,88 and the decision was typical of the times.89 
In upholding the law, the unanimous Court cited the government’s 
sovereign power to exclude foreigners.90 The Court found the 
government’s “power of exclusion of foreigners . . . as a part of those 
sovereign powers delegated by the constitution [to be exercised] at any 
time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country 
require it.”91 Those powers “cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf 
of any one.”92 
If Chae Chan Ping was limited to exclusion, Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States93 was its companion case for deportation, affirming that the 
structural relationships among the branches limited the rights of foreign 
nationals to challenge their expulsion.94 The law at issue in Fong Yue Ting 
required resident aliens to acquire a certificate of residence to remain in the 
United States.95 To obtain that certificate, the non-citizen needed to 
produce at least one white witness to attest to the foreign national’s good 
                                                                                                                          
82 130 U.S. 581 (1889).   
83 Id. at 603, 609. However, as immigration scholars have pointed out, the foundations of the 
plenary power doctrine trace back to earlier cases in which the Court invalidated state immigration 
legislation, and may have evolved partly out of a misplaced reliance on those precedents. See 
LEGOMSKY, supra note 6, at 180–82. 
84 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581–82. 
85 Id. at 582. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 581, 599. 
88 See Cleveland, supra note 52, at 112–30 (describing, inter alia, the history of anti-Chinese 
legislation and public sentiment in the United States from the mid-nineteenth century to Chae Chan 
Ping). 
89 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595 (describing how even after the treaty of 1868 was 
enacted to give Chinese immigrants the same rights as U.S. citizens, Asian immigration was still 
viewed as an “invasion” and “menace” to the entire country).   
90 Id. at 609, 611 (upholding the law with no dissenting opinions).  
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
94 Id. at 698. 
95 Id. at 726. For a discussion of the passage and details of the Geary Act, see Cleveland, supra 
note 52, at 137–38.  
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character and past residence.96 Two of the three plaintiffs did not attempt to 
register or acquire a certificate; the third had attempted to register using a 
Chinese witness.97 All three were ordered deported, and the suit was their 
challenge to not only those orders, but also to the law authorizing those 
orders—a piece of the larger movement by the Chinese community against 
the increasingly onerous laws targeting them.98 The Court upheld the law, 
quoting extensively from Chae Chan Ping for the proposition that the 
exclusion of foreigners is a power “incident of every independent 
nation.”99 The Court concluded that the sovereign’s power to deport is no 
different.100 
To the extent that the decisions at the turn of the twentieth century 
recognized any limitations on the plenary powers, they were limited to 
procedural rights. In Yamataya v. Fisher,101 the Court prevented the 
government from deporting a foreign national allegedly in the United 
States illegally.102 The Court specifically recognized judicial review of 
executive action for arbitrariness, and required that the foreign national 
receive an adequate opportunity to contest her status.103 Yet despite this 
very minor glimmer of individual-rights protection, the precise formulation 
of that due process framework was generally hard to identify. Of course, 
owing to the categorical conception of territoriality, any decisions 
recognizing the due process rights of foreign nationals would have been 
limited to cases in which the individual was already on U.S. soil. In cases 
involving exclusion (where a foreign national was seeking entry), 
plaintiffs—even those with long periods of residency in the United States 
who took brief trips abroad—received only the procedures the executive 
provided, and that often meant no process at all.    
2.  Modern Cases 
Decades after its early plenary power cases, the Supreme Court 
continued to take a group-based, categorical approach to immigration. The 
Court produced a host of opinions that, despite expressing a growing 
sympathy surrounding the “drastic measure”104 of deportation and its effect 
                                                                                                                          
96 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 726; see also Cleveland, supra note 52, at 137. 
97 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 702–04; Cleveland, supra note 52, at 138. 
98 Cleveland, supra note 52, at 138. 
99 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705 (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 
(1889)). 
100 Id. at 707 (“The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized 
or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as 
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.”). 
101 189 U.S. 86 (1903).  
102 Id. at 86. 
103 Id. at 101. 
104 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). 
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on non-citizens, only confirmed the harshness of the early rule.105 Those 
cases—U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,106 Shaughnessy v. United States 
ex rel. Mezei,107 and Harisiades v. Shaughnessy108—confirmed the basic, 
group-based structure of immigration law: prior to entry, foreigners had 
essentially no rights, but once inside the territorial United States, they had 
limited procedural rights (but, owing to the plenary power doctrine, no 
substantive rights).109 In Knauff, the Court invoked the plenary power 
doctrine to allow the exclusion, on undisclosed grounds, of an alien who 
was married to a U.S. citizen.110 The Court’s now-famous formulation held 
that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process 
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”111   
Mezei authorized the indefinite detention at Ellis Island of a lawful 
permanent resident who was denied reentry to the U.S. after an extended 
trip abroad.112 There, the Court led its analysis with citations to Che Chan 
Ping and Fong Yue Ting.113 The Court reasoned that the respondent’s time 
abroad had extinguished any rights to due process that he might have 
carried with him.114 The Court further reasoned that, as he had not been 
                                                                                                                          
105 See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953) (“Whatever 
our individual estimate of . . . [Congress’s exclusion] policy and the fears on which it rests, 
respondent’s right to enter the United States depends on the congressional will, and courts cannot 
substitute their judgment for the legislative mandate.”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–
88 (1952) (“That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is a practice that bristles 
with severities. But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power 
inherent in every sovereign state. Such is the traditional power of the Nation over the alien and we 
leave the law on the subject as we find it.”); see also id. at 590 (“We, in our private opinions, need not 
concur in Congress’ policies to hold its enactments constitutional. Judicially we must tolerate what 
personally we may regard as a legislative mistake.”).  
Even as more modern courts expressed growing sympathy surrounding the “drastic measure” of 
deportation and its effect on non-citizens, stare decisis proved to be a bulwark to judicial review—at 
least where substantive claims were at issue. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) 
(“[T]he slate is not clean. . . . But that the formulation of these [immigration] policies is entrusted 
exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of 
our body politic as any aspect of our government.”). 
106 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
107 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
108 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
109 See Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power, supra note 5, at 560 
(“Taken together, Knauff, Mezei, and Harisiades confirmed the modern importance of the two basic 
lines of inquiry in the early plenary power decisions: the alien’s location and the type of constitutional 
challenge. . . . [A]liens ‘outside’ the United States would continue to find it very difficult to raise any 
constitutional challenge to immigration decisions. Those ‘inside’ the United States could have some 
success with procedural claims but would be likely to have none with substantive claims.”). 
110 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539–40, 546–47. 
111 Id. at 544. 
112 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215–16. 
113 Id. at 210 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). 
114 See id. at 214 (noting that respondent’s departure from the U.S. and subsequent nineteenth 
month stay “behind the Iron Curtain,” without apparent authorization or reentry papers, amounted to a 
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allowed reentry at Ellis Island, he should still be treated formally as if 
outside the United States.115 Moreover, because no other country would 
allow him entry, the U.S. government could detain him indefinitely in 
order to effectuate physical exclusion.116   
Finally, Harisiades demonstrated the limitations on judicial review for 
lawful permanent residents in the United States.117 The Harisiades Court 
upheld the deportation of three foreign nationals because of their prior 
membership in the Communist Party—even though each had subsequently 
disavowed his membership.118 The Court cited Fong Yue Ting for the 
proposition that the government retains the power to revoke an 
immigrant’s status at will,119 a power that inheres in sovereignty.120   
While the outcomes of these cases seem unusually harsh, they flowed 
logically from the basic structure of plenary power. Provided that judicial 
review relied on categorical distinctions of sovereignty and territoriality, 
buttressed by a binary, group-based conception of one’s status as either a 
citizen or non-citizen, due process protections appeared to be a matter of 
legislative (and at times, executive121) decision-making and not a matter for 
judicial protection.   
B.  Categorical Approaches in National Security  
The same categorical approach underlying the plenary power doctrine 
in immigration also defined more than a century of national security 
doctrine.122 Courts tended to apply categorical distinctions based on status 
                                                                                                                          
“protracted absence” and was thus a “clear break in an alien’s continuous residence [in the U.S.]” 
(citations omitted)). 
115 See id. at 213 (“Neither respondent’s harborage on Ellis Island nor his prior residence here 
transforms this into something other than an exclusion proceeding. . . . [H]arborage at Ellis Island is not 
an entry into the United States. . . . He is an entering alien just the same, and may be excluded if 
unqualified for admission under existing immigration laws.” (citations omitted)). 
116 See id. at 215–16 (rejecting the premise that “respondent’s continued exclusion deprives him 
of any statutory or constitutional right”). 
117 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591, 596 (1952) (expressing that the “world-
wide amelioration of the lot of aliens . . . should not be initiated by judicial decision” but rather is a 
field in which “[r]eform . . . must be entrusted to the branches of the Government in control of our 
international relations and treaty-making powers”). 
118 Id. at 581–83, 596. 
119 Id. at 586–88 (“Most importantly, to protract this ambiguous status within the country is not 
his right but is a matter of permission and tolerance. The Government’s power to terminate its 
hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this Court since the question first arose.” (citing Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 711–14, 730 (1893))).  
120 Id. at 587–88. 
121 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
122  See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 13 (2005) (“Congress has allowed the executive branch to assume the leadership 
and initiative in war, and has chosen for itself the role of approving military actions after the fact by 
declarations of support and by appropriations. At the same time, the courts have invoked the political 
question doctrine to avoid interfering in war powers questions.”); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron 
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or location to disclaim a role that might otherwise interfere with the 
government’s policies during times of war. The traditional protection 
framework in the national security context was predicated upon 
“distinctions between domestic and foreign, enemy and friend, peace and 
war, citizen and noncitizen . . . .”123 As Andrew Kent has noted:  
At common law and during the American Founding period, a 
very strict rule was applied barring all alien enemies—
wherever domiciled, and no matter whether civilians or 
enemy fighters—from access to the courts during wartime. In 
the first decades of the nineteenth century, the rule softened 
so that civilian enemy aliens who were peacefully present in 
the United States could access the courts. The categorical bar 
remained, however, for nonresident alien enemies and enemy 
fighters, no matter where located.124 
The categorical, group-based approach is epitomized by Johnson v. 
Eisentrager,125 in which the Court rejected habeas corpus rights for foreign 
nationals captured, tried, and detained on foreign soil.126 The petitioners in 
Eisentrager were German citizens who were tried and convicted in 
overseas military commissions for continuing to wage war against the 
United States after the close of World War II.127 The Court rested its 
holding on a number of categorical distinctions along the axes of 
citizenship, location, and status.128 Justice Jackson’s majority opinion 
noted the presence of “inherent distinctions recognized throughout the 
civilized world between citizens and aliens . . . between aliens of friendly 
and of enemy allegiance . . . [and] between resident enemy aliens who have 
submitted themselves to our laws and nonresident enemy aliens who at all 
times have remained with, and adhered to, enemy governments.”129 Taking 
“the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction” as a necessary 
condition for the alien to be subject to judicial power,130 Jackson concluded 
that the Court was powerless to resolve the claims of “nonresident enemy 
alien[s]” who lacked even a “qualified access to our courts.”131 
Eisentrager came to stand for the idea that foreign nationals held 
                                                                                                                          
Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 673 (2000) (arguing that foreign affairs law is 
characterized “by exceedingly broad executive branch power and sweeping deference by the courts”). 
123 Kent, supra note 78, at 17. 
124 Id. 
125 339 U.S. 763 (1950).   
126 Id. at 765–67, 781, 791.  
127 Id. at 765–67. 
128 Id. at 769–71. 
129 Id. at 769. 
130 Id. at 771 (noting that a foreign national’s presence inside the U.S. “gave the Judiciary power 
to act”). 
131 Id. at 776. 
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beyond U.S. shores have no access to habeas corpus to challenge their 
confinement or the process by which they are convicted in an overseas 
tribunal. The Supreme Court reiterated that rule in United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez132 when it rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge by a 
Mexican national who was charged in a U.S. court on the basis of evidence 
procured through an apartment search in Mexico by U.S. officials that 
violated the Fourth Amendment.133 Verdugo-Urquidez interpreted 
Eisentrager expansively, further establishing that foreign nationals without 
any “significant voluntary connection with the United States” lacked 
presumptive access to protection afforded by the Constitution.134 The 
Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez line of cases thus provided the 
executive with an effective argument which it had “held in its back pocket 
for many years” against judicial review of national security policy.135 
These categorical rejections of due process for non-citizens required 
near-total deference by the judiciary in matters of foreign affairs—a 
“foreign affairs exceptionalism”136 that had been epitomized by Justice 
Sutherland’s majority opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright,137 which 
celebrated the president’s “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . . 
as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations.”138 Ex Parte Quirin,139 decided six years after Curtiss-Wright, 
also reflected national security exceptionalism by rejecting habeas petitions 
by eight German saboteurs (including two U.S. citizens) who had been 
tried and convicted by a military commission for violations of the laws of 
war.140 The Quirin Court rejected the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
challenges to the government’s authority to try the petitioners with war 
crimes by military commissions.141  
Dames & Moore v. Regan,142 decided thirty years after Eisentrager, 
also justified broad executive powers in light of Congress’s inability to 
“anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President 
                                                                                                                          
132 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
133 Id. at 274–75. 
134 See id. at 267, 271 (“There is likewise no indication that the Fourth Amendment was 
understood by contemporaries of the Framers to apply to activities of the United States directed against 
aliens in foreign territory or in international waters.”). 
135 Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo Cases, 2004 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 49, 54–55. 
136 Curtis Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1096 
(1999); see also Louis Henkin, The Constitution for Its Third Century: Foreign Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 713, 716 (1989) (noting that matters touching on foreign affairs are “special” under U.S. law). 
137 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
138 Id. at 320.  
139 317 U.S. 1 (1942).    
140 Id. at 48. 
141 Id. at 45. The Court also held that United States citizenship did not insulate the two citizen-
enemy combatants from the consequences of committing war crimes. Id. at 37. 
142 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
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may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might 
act.”143 Although the Court disclaimed some of the more expansive 
rhetoric associated with Curtiss-Wright,144 scholars generally see Dames & 
Moore as supporting the basic principle of national security exceptionalism 
that “the President [is] the primary governmental authority over matters of 
foreign policy.”145  
C.  Individuated Approaches in Immigration 
After nearly a century of categorical frameworks predicated on 
sovereignty, citizenship, and territory, the Court slowly began to usher in 
an individuated framework in immigration and national security. While 
that shift occurred mainly in the wake of the due process revolution of the 
1970s, the seeds of change began to emerge prior to that period. In a string 
of exclusion cases decided in the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court 
issued unexpected interpretations of Eisentrager, eventually supporting a 
direct constitutional link between domestic due process protections and the 
immigration context more generally. Interestingly, the Court would later 
apply those same immigration law precedents to national security—
constitutionalizing court access for post-9/11 foreign-national detainees  at 
Guantánamo Bay.146 While these developing due process norms led to both 
victories and defeats for foreign nationals, courts would no longer simply 
ignore their due process rights as the prior categorical approach had often 
required. The more often that courts applied the new due process 
protections to immigration and national security, the more the old 
approaches diminished in importance. 
The first such case, Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,147 involved a lawful 
permanent resident of Chinese descent who signed on as chief steward of 
an American merchant ship scheduled to travel to several foreign ports 
before docking back in New York.148 Chew was technically excludable 
when he returned from his voyage abroad, meaning he was not entitled to 
                                                                                                                          
143 Id. at 678. 
144 See id. at 688 (“Finally, we re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision. We do not decide 
that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as against foreign governmental 
entities.”). 
145 MARTIN S. SHEFFER, THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 136 
(1999); see also DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 947 
(1993) (“Justice Rehnquist’s opinion makes more sense under Curtiss-Wright than it does under the 
Steel Seizure opinion.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign 
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1310–11 (1988) (arguing that Dames & 
Moore approximates Curtiss-Wright by giving the President an expanded national security power 
during times of emergency). 
146 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (holding that foreign nationals 
detained at Guantánamo Bay can access the Constitution’s Suspension Clause).   
147 344 U.S. 590 (1953).   
148 Id. at 592–94.  
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due process benefits upon reentry, but the Court distinguished Chew’s 
constitutional status (as a lawful permanent resident) from his immigration 
status and found that, regardless of whether Chew should be treated as an 
entrant alien for immigration purposes, Chew’s sea voyage did not 
terminate his constitutional status as a lawful permanent resident entitled to 
Fifth Amendment due process protections.149 The Court then 
“assimilate[d]” Chew’s “status to that of an alien continuously residing and 
physically present in the United States,”150 granting him the same rights he 
would have enjoyed “had he not undertaken his voyage to foreign ports but 
had remained continuously within the territorial boundaries of the United 
States.”151 Based on that reasoning, the Court accorded Chew the full due 
process protections of the Fifth Amendment.152 
To support its conclusion, the Court invoked dicta from Eisentrager 
that gave the case a highly individualistic gloss.153 While Eisentrager 
generally appeared to stand for the proposition that foreign nationals 
located outside the United States could not invoke constitutional 
protections,154 Justice Jackson also wrote that “[t]he alien, to whom the 
United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a 
generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our 
society.”155 By relying on that dicta and applying it to the individual 
circumstances of the case at hand, Chew recast Eisentrager in a way that 
would eventually pry open due process protections in additional 
immigration and—later—national security cases. After Chew, the Court 
began to focus more intently on the individual equities and circumstances 
of particular cases. In one ruling after another, the Court sidestepped the 
implications of the plenary power doctrine and required due process 
hearings that existing laws did not provide. 
In Rosenberg v. Fleuti,156 the Court again evaded a provision requiring 
                                                                                                                          
149 Id. at 600 (noting that the Court “do[es] not regard the constitutional status which petitioner 
indisputably enjoyed prior to his voyage as terminated by that voyage” and that “[f]rom a constitutional 
point of view, he is entitled to due process without regard to whether or not, for immigration purposes, 
he is to be treated as an entrant alien”).  
150 Id. at 596. 
151 Id.  
152 Id. at 601.  
153 Id. at 596–97 n.5 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770–71 (1950)). 
154 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (citing Eisentrager for the 
proposition that “aliens . . . outside the sovereign territory of the United States” are not entitled to 
constitutional protections); id. at 274–75 (1990) (noting that the respondent had “no voluntary 
attachment to the United States” and thus “the Fourth Amendment ha[d] no application”). 
155 Chew, 344 U.S. at 596 n.5 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770 (1950)); see also Motomura, 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power, supra note 5, at 570–75 (“The Court favored a 
constitutional norm of procedural due process for returning permanent residents like Chew, even if the 
statute and regulations, by applying the reentry doctrine to a temporary departure, treated them no 
better than first-time entrants.” (citation omitted)). 
156 374 U.S. 449 (1963). 
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the exclusion of a lawful permanent resident who, despite four years of 
continuous presence in the United States, was technically barred from 
reentering after spending just a few hours across the Mexican border.157 
Under then-extant provisions of immigration law,158 Fleuti could not 
reenter because he was deemed “afflicted with psychopathic personality,” a 
circumlocution for homosexuality.159 The Court sidestepped that outcome 
by extrapolating from Fleuti’s circumstances a set of considerations, 
including “the length of time the alien is absent . . . the purpose of the 
visit . . . [and] whether the alien has to procure any travel documents in 
order to make his trip.”160 The Court refused to place a limit on the number 
of relevant considerations, and it refused to make any single factor decisive 
to the outcome. Based on those criteria, the Court deemed Fleuti’s 
“innocent, casual, and brief excursion . . . outside this country’s borders” 
as not “disruptive of his resident alien status.”161 Accordingly, the Court 
did not subject Fleuti “to the consequences of an ‘entry’ into the country 
on his return”162—namely, a denial of entry based on homosexuality. Using 
constitutional-sounding language (but not constitutional doctrine), the 
Court held that:  
when an alien like Fleuti who has entered the country 
lawfully and has acquired a residence here steps across a 
border and, in effect, steps right back, subjecting him to 
exclusion for a condition for which he could not have been 
deported had he remained in the country . . . [he] would 
seldom be aware that he was possibly walking into a trap, for 
the insignificance of a brief trip to Mexico or Canada bears 
little rational relation to the punitive consequence of 
subsequent excludability.163 
Fleuti described Chew as a case holding “that the returning resident 
alien is entitled as a matter of due process to a hearing on the charges 
underlying any attempt to exclude him.”164 As it had done in Chew, Fleuti 
framed that inquiry in regulatory, not constitutional, language by 
assimilating the foreign national’s status to that of a continually present 
immigrant165 for departures that were “innocent, casual, and brief.”166 Still, 
                                                                                                                          
157 Id. at 450. 
158 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1952); Rosenberg, 374 U.S. at 450–51 (stating that a “new charge was 
lodged against respondent” on the basis that he was an alien “afflicted with psychopathic personality”). 
159 Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 451. 
160 Id. at 462. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 460–61. 
164 Id. at 460. 
165 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 600 (1953).  
166 Rosenberg, 374 U.S. at 461. 
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the Court’s individualistic inquiries in Chew and Fleuti, which centered on 
a foreign national’s broader ties to the United States and his or her stake in 
the overall process, was reflective of an emerging constitutional doctrine 
protecting individual rights. Chew and Fleuti thus placed immigration 
doctrine on a collision course with the categorical rules underlying earlier 
decisions. Although Chew and Fleuti sidestepped direct constitutional 
language, the Court appeared to undermine cases such as Knauff and Mezei 
that relied on categorical, plenary-power-style reasoning. Eventually, 
twenty years after Fleuti, the Supreme Court made those constitutional 
implications explicit by applying Mathews directly to the context of 
immigration exclusion. In Landon v. Plasencia,167 the Court held that the 
Mathews due process framework would apply to cases of excludable 
foreign nationals, undermining, and likely invalidating, the categorical 
approach that the plenary power doctrine seemed to require.168  
Plasencia was a lawful permanent resident who, similar to Chew and 
Fleuti, was formally treated as if she were entering the country for the first 
time after a brief departure from the United States. Justice O’Connor’s 
majority opinion noted candidly that the Court’s recent immigrant-friendly 
decisions, while resting on “regulatory interpretation,” were in fact 
grounded in “constitutional law”169 and thus applied Mathews directly to 
the exclusion context. In applying that framework, Justice O’Connor 
placed great weight on the private interests involved. Plasencia risked 
“los[ing] the right ‘to stay and live and work in this land of freedom’”170 as 
well as “the right to rejoin her immediate family, a right that ranks high 
among the interests of the individual,”171 and those interests counted 
greatly in the overall calculus. The foreign national’s interest was “a 
weighty one,”172 and given “the gravity of Plasencia’s interest,”173 the 
Court remanded the case to the lower courts to determine whether 
Plasencia had received adequate process.174 
In addition to re-reading prior cases “of regulatory interpretation” as 
decisions “of constitutional law,”175 the Plasencia Court re-interpreted 
language from Eisentrager, Chew, and Fleuti as requiring a more 
                                                                                                                          
167 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
168 The Court took pains to point out that its ruling did not undermine Mezei, and that if the 
“permanent resident alien’s absence is extended” the foreign national “may lose his entitlement to 
assimilation of his status.” Id. at 33 (alterations and citations omitted). Because “Plasencia was absent 
from the country only a few days,” the Court did not reach the question of whether due process would 
apply in cases, such as Mezei, in which the foreign national was absent for a longer period. Id. at 34. 
169 Id. at 33. 
170 Id. at 34. 
171 Id. 
172 Id.  
173 Id. at 37. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 33. 
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straightforward application of constitutional norms to the removal 
context.176 Despite Justice O’Connor’s disclaimer in Plasencia that the 
Court would not opine specifically on “the contours of the process” that 
was due to Plasencia177—ostensibly leaving to lower courts the 
responsibility for determining the end result of “whether the process 
accorded Plasencia was insufficient”178—the Court’s transplantation of 
Mathews began to reshape its approach to immigration law. Roughly 
twenty years later, the Court would apply, and expand, due process 
protections to national security in a nearly identical fashion. 
D.  Individuated Approaches in National Security 
Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the relevant national security 
doctrines lacked any due process content. The analysis remained 
categorical—turning on the status of the foreign national (enemy or 
friendly), the location of capture or trial, and whether the United States was 
at war or at peace. Cases such as Quirin and Eisentrager limited or ruled 
out the possibility that enemy combatants would receive constitutional 
protections of any kind, and that rule included both citizen and non-citizen 
combatants.179 In the early post-9/11 litigation, the government relied on 
that categorical analysis to reject due process rights for terror suspects held 
at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere.180 However, the legal landscape 
changed dramatically when the Supreme Court extended the same 
individuated analyses developed in the immigration context to the war on 
terrorism.  
In the wake of 9/11, the Supreme Court issued a string of rulings 
applying individuated analyses to clashes between individual rights and the 
government’s claimed security need, with surprisingly rights-affirming 
outcomes. In 2004, the Court held in Rasul v. Bush181 that enemy 
combatant detainees at Guantánamo Bay could challenge their detention 
through habeas corpus petitions182 in federal district court.183 That same 
                                                                                                                          
176 Id. at 32 (“[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that 
go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.” (citing Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950))). 
177 Id. (emphasis added).  
178 Id.  
179 See supra text accompanying notes 125–45. 
180 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent at 35, 37, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 
03-343), 2004 WL 425739 (arguing that “[t]he ‘enemy’ status of aliens captured and detained during 
war is a quintessential political question on which the courts respect the actions of the political 
branches,” and that with respect to these matters, “courts have . . . no judicially-manageable 
standards . . . to evaluate or second-guess the conduct of the President or the military”); id. at 43 
(exercising jurisdiction “would thrust the federal courts into the extraordinary role of reviewing the 
military’s conduct of hostilities overseas”). 
181 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
182 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). 
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day, the Court held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld184 that U.S. citizen detainees 
were entitled to a meaningful opportunity to challenge their confinement in 
executive detention.185 Two years later, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,186 the 
Court held that the military tribunals convened by the president at 
Guantánamo Bay were unlawful without congressional authorization.187 In 
2008, the Court held in Boumediene v. Bush188 that Congress violated the 
constitutional rights of Guantánamo detainees when it substituted habeas 
review with an inadequate alternative process.189   
Many of the Court’s post-9/11 national security decisions are 
predicated on the same interpretations of Eisentrager and Mathews that 
dominated immigration law. Rasul rejected the formalistic reading of 
Eisentrager that had prevailed in prior Supreme Court and lower court 
opinions190 and held that “nothing in Eisentrager or in any of our other 
cases categorically excludes aliens detained in military custody outside the 
United States from the ‘privilege of litigation’ in U.S. courts.”191 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Rasul relied on—and extended—the same 
“ascending scale of rights” language that Chew and Plasencia unearthed 
from Eisentrager.192 Building on that interpretation, Justice Kennedy 
advanced an expansive reading of Eisentrager, engaging a broad spectrum 
of considerations relevant to the government’s war-on-terror policies, 
including the level of control exerted over the locality in question,193 what 
                                                                                                                          
183 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466. 
184 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
185 Id. at 537–38.    
186 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
187 Id. at 634–35. 
188 533 U.S. 723 (2008). 
189 Id. at 797–98. 
190 See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court in Verdugo-
Urquidez interpreted Eisentrager to categorically reject constitutional rights for foreign nationals 
located outside the United States); see also Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777–78 (1950)) (interpreting Eisentrager to hold 
that “‘the privilege of litigation’ does not extend to aliens in military custody who have no presence in 
‘any territory over which the United States is sovereign’”); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 
(D.D.C. 2002) (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777–78) (relying on Eisentrager’s holding that “aliens 
detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States [may not] invok[e] a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus”), rev’d, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
191 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also distinguished the 
Guantánamo detainees from those in Eisentrager in numerous respects. The Guantánamo inmates were 
“not nationals of countries at war with the United States.” Id. at 467. Further, the Court noted they 
“den[ied] that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against this country; they have never 
been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for 
more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises 
exclusive jurisdiction and control.” Id. 
192 Id. at 486 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770). 
193 Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United 
States territory . . . .”).  
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(if any) national security interests would be affected by an exercise of 
jurisdiction,194 and the distance between the place where the detainees were 
held and the actual theater of war from which they were purportedly 
captured.195 He asked: How do we know the individual is an enemy?196 
How much process did he receive in that determination? How long has the 
individual been detained?197 Justice Kennedy’s analysis not only 
sidestepped prior, categorical approaches, but also expanded the inquiry to 
give judges far more flexibility to handle sensitive national security cases 
than what the Court’s prior, exceptionalist doctrines allowed.  
When Justice Kennedy’s view captured a Court majority four years 
later in Boumediene v. Bush, his reading of Eisentrager converged with 
Mathews in a way that would formally retire the “formalistic, sovereignty-
based test for determining the reach of the Suspension Clause.”198 In place 
of its prior categorical test, the Court applied a multi-pronged analysis 
based on  
at least three factors . . . (1) the citizenship and status of the 
detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that 
status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites 
where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) 
the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s 
entitlement to the writ.199 
The transplantation of Mathews into the national security context 
began four years prior to Boumediene, when Justice O’Connor, writing for 
a Court plurality in Hamdi, outlined an individuated process that 
eventually became the centerpiece for hearings at Guantánamo. The 
government argued that the judicial branch should defer out of “[r]espect 
for separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of courts 
in matters of military decision-making in connection with an ongoing 
conflict,”200 but the Court—noting prior immigration law precedents—
recognized “that an individual challenging his detention may not be held at 
                                                                                                                          
194 Id. at 486 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that one of the inquiries in Eisentrager was 
whether “the existence of jurisdiction would have had a clear harmful effect on the Nation’s military 
affairs”). 
195 Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Guantanamo Bay . . . is one far removed from any 
hostilities.”). 
196 Id. at 487–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he detainees at Guantanamo Bay are being 
held . . . without benefit of any legal proceeding to determine their status.”). 
197 Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he detainees at Guantanamo Bay are being held 
indefinitely . . . .”). 
198 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762 (2008); see also id. (rejecting the idea that the oft-
cited claim linking Eisentrager with the absence of constitutional protections for non-citizens detained 
beyond U.S. borders is “the only authoritative language in the opinion and that all the rest is dicta”). 
199 Id. at 766 (emphasis added). 
200 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the will of the Executive without recourse to some proceeding before a 
neutral tribunal to determine whether the Executive’s asserted justifications 
for that detention have basis in fact and warrant in law.”201 Framing the 
issue through the lens of due process,202 the Court turned to Mathews as the 
“ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such serious competing 
interests.”203   
Had Hamdi been a case involving the petitioner’s access to welfare or 
Social Security benefits, Mathews would have undoubtedly been the proper 
analytical tool. Applied to the indefinite detention context, however, 
Mathews was hardly “ordinary.” Without fanfare, the Court replaced its 
prior, categorical framework with an individualistic approach requiring 
significant court involvement, including an assessment of “the function 
involved” and “a judicious balancing of” various interests.204 
Having applied Mathews to the enemy-combatant context, the Court 
was in a position to take Hamdi’s specific circumstances and private 
interests much more seriously. Hamdi surely had an interest—“the most 
elemental of liberty interests”—to be “free from physical detention by [his] 
own government.”205 That interest could not so easily be “offset by the 
circumstances of war or the accusation of treasonous behavior, for ‘[i]t is 
clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation 
of liberty that requires due process protection.’”206 This meant that further 
hearings and fact-finding would be necessary. While Hamdi could be tried 
under government-friendly procedures allowing the use of hearsay and a 
shifting of the ordinary burdens of proof in the government’s favor,207 
Hamdi was entitled to notice and a fair opportunity to contest the 
government’s charges before a neutral arbiter.208 The Court noted that “in 
                                                                                                                          
201 Id. at 528 (citing, inter alia, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)). 
202 The Court described the conflict at hand as a “tension . . . between the autonomy that the 
Government asserts is necessary in order to pursue effectively a particular goal and the process that a 
citizen contends he is due.” Id. 
203 Id. at 528–29 (emphasis added). 
204 Id. at 529. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 530 (citation omitted) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)). 
207 Id. at 533–34. 
208 Id. at 533. Recognizing that Mathews does not specify particular procedures, the Court 
deferred to the executive on the precise content of those procedures. It noted that national security 
exigencies might require vastly curtained procedural rights: the tribunals might have to accept hearsay 
evidence introduced by the Government and accord that evidence a rebuttable presumption of 
reliability. See id. at 533–34 (“Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable 
available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution would not be 
offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption 
remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.”). The government would 
also be permitted to use military tribunals in lieu of standard civilian courts. See id. at 538 (noting that 
the collateral process could be provided “by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted 
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the words of Mathews, process of this sort would sufficiently address the 
‘risk of an erroneous deprivation’ of a detainee’s liberty interest while 
eliminating certain procedures that have questionable additional value in 
light of the burden on the Government.”209    
The novelty of the Court’s application of Mathews is sharpened by the 
dissents that the opinion provoked. Justice Scalia mocked the Court’s 
claimed “authority to engage in this sort of ‘judicious balancing’ from 
Mathews . . . a case involving . . . the withdrawal of disability benefits!”210 
Justice Scalia would have resolved Hamdi’s case under the core 
constitutional and common law protections owed to all citizens211: either 
the government should prosecute him for treason, or Congress should 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus.212 Justice Thomas, in his dissent, also 
invoked a categorical approach, but for the contrary conclusion that the 
Court should have deferred completely to the government’s claimed 
security need—something the Court “lack[ed] the expertise and capacity to 
second-guess.”213 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush—applying the 
Suspension Clause to Guantánamo Bay and invalidating the jurisdiction-
stripping provision in the Military Commissions Act—expands the 
Mathews analysis even further.214 After the Court found that there was no 
conclusive historical answer to the question of whether the habeas writ 
would run to foreigners held off U.S. shores,215 it again used a due process 
methodology to resolve the question of whether the Suspension Clause 
reached claims by “enemy” foreign-nationals held at Guantánamo Bay. 
The Court began by pointing out the centrality of Mathews in its prior 
enemy-combatant case law, noting that “there are places in the Hamdi 
plurality opinion where it is difficult to tell where its extrapolation of [the 
habeas statute] ends and its analysis of the petitioner’s due process rights 
begins.”216 Again relying on due process methodology, the Court goes on 
                                                                                                                          
military tribunal”). Such modifications to standard procedural and substantive protections were 
necessary during “a time of ongoing military conflict.” Id. at 533. 
209 Id. at 534 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 355 (1976)). 
210 Id. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
211 Justice Scalia made clear that his opinion would not apply to foreign nationals. See id. at 558–
59. 
212 Id. at 554 (“Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our 
constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime. 
Where the exigencies of war prevent that, the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, 
allows Congress to relax the usual protections temporarily. Absent suspension, however, the 
executive’s assertion of military exigency has not been thought sufficient to permit detention without 
charge. No one contends that the congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force, on which the 
Government relies to justify its actions here, is an implementation of the Suspension Clause.”). 
213 Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
214 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781 (2008). 
215 Id. at 739, 752. 
216 Id. at 784. 
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to state that “the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon 
the rigor of any earlier proceedings,” a point that “accords with our test for 
procedural adequacy” in Mathews and its progeny.217   
As Boumediene indicates, Mathews essentially became the standard for 
reviewing executive detention—“enemy” or “friendly,” citizen or non-
citizen, on or off U.S. shores. In that sense, Hamdi and Boumediene are a 
piece of a group of Supreme Court decisions after 9/11 affirming a stronger 
judicial hand in deciding national security questions regarding the 
detentions and trials of enemy-combatant detainees. These decisions are 
marked by the absence of bright-line categorical considerations and an 
increase in individuated analyses of particular circumstances. But they also 
highlight a more self-confident judiciary that, over time, began to assert 
comparative levels of expertise on sensitive immigration and national 
security matters. As courts became increasingly comfortable using 
balancing approaches in cases pitting the rights of foreign nationals against 
the government, they necessarily began to focus on the merits of the 
underlying policies as well. While the Court has stopped short of claiming 
a role in deciding all matters of immigration and national security policy, it 
has become far more enmeshed in national security decision-making than 
what the early categorical doctrines seemed to allow.   
IV. MATHEWS AND JUDICIAL SELF-CONFIDENCE  
While the application of Mathews to immigration and national security 
has ushered in an important shift in the relationship between the Court and 
the political branches, the changes should not be overstated. First, the 
Court began to signal a renewed approach to judicial review in a string of 
pre-Mathews immigration cases interpreting Eisentrager.218 Second, the 
application of Mathews to certain national security cases involving U.S. 
citizens appears to reduce constitutional protections.219 In the immigration 
context, moreover, federal courts have occasionally relied on Mathews to 
vindicate policies that drastically reduce due process rights for foreign 
nationals in removal proceedings.  
For example, the lower federal courts have relied on Mathews to 
uphold agency reforms that eliminated appellate rights in removal 
hearings. In the wake of policy changes that dramatically enhanced the use 
of summary appellate dispositions of immigration judge decisions and 
                                                                                                                          
217 Id. at 781 (emphasis added); see also id. at 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (lamenting the 
Court’s decision to require that judicial review procedures over Guantánamo “meet the minimal due 
process requirements outlined in Hamdi,” a case involving a U.S. citizen). 
218 See supra notes 153–78 and accompanying text. 
219 See, e.g., supra notes 74–78, 210–12 and accompanying text (discussing the diminishment of 
protections for U.S. citizens under a Mathews-style regime). 
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virtually eliminating panel review by the Board of Immigration Appeals,220 
the federal courts unanimously upheld those changes—despite their harsh 
consequences—often by relying on Mathews.221 Indeed, in the wake of 
those reforms, judges have issued scathing decisions denouncing 
immigration judges and Board of Immigration Appeals opinions, often 
condemning the lack of integrity to the proceedings.222 Even though the 
Supreme Court has increasingly expressed concerns with unreviewable 
executive branch determinations in the context of immigration removal and 
detention,223 courts, for now, have upheld agency streamlining reforms 
under the Mathews framework. 
The D.C. Circuit has equally applied formal, categorical analyses to a 
number of different cases involving the due process rights of Guantánamo 
                                                                                                                          
220 Those reforms were instituted in 2002 to reduce delays in immigration proceedings by 
essentially eliminating the appellate process within the immigration agency. Under the new regulations, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft ordered that most immigration decisions be decided by a single Board 
member and without a written opinion. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To 
Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (stating that the procedures 
are intended to reduce delays in the review process); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2009) (stating the 
standards for summary dismissal of appeals). Single-member decisions had been permitted beginning 
in 1999. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed.Reg. 54,878, 54,878–79 (Aug. 26, 2002); Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 56,135, 56,135–42 (Oct. 18, 1999) (describing the streamlined process). Ashcroft also fired 
twelve of the twenty-three Board members, leaving an eleven-member Board, and ordered the Board of 
Immigration Appeals to clear its 55,000 case backlog in six months. Board of Immigration Appeals: 
Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed.Reg. at 54,893–94, 54,903; see also Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 
350–51 (2007) (discussing how the Ashcroft proposal “made single member decision making the 
‘dominant method of adjudication for the large majority of cases’”). 
221 Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying Mathews to uphold 
the affirmance-without-opinion procedure); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 239–42 (3d Cir. 2003) (en 
banc) (same); Denko v. I.N.S., 351 F.3d 717, 730 n.10 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); Falcon Carriche v. 
Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 851–52 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). However, courts did point out that they might 
change course if it turned out that the agency failed to implement its regulations with integrity. For 
example, one circuit court noted that its review of the streamlining procedures might look quite 
different if the petitioners could produce “evidence of systemic violation by the BIA of its regulations.” 
Albathani v. I.N.S., 318 F.3d 365, 378 (1st Cir. 2003). Other circuits signaled a similar view. See, e.g., 
Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing and agreeing with the analysis 
in Albathani); Denko, 351 F.3d at 728 (same). 
222 See, e.g., Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is no logical or 
evidentiary basis for the [Immigration Judge’s] conclusion that [the petitioner] was not persecuted on 
account of one of the statutorily-enumerated grounds.”); Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 270 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (criticizing the Immigration Judge for “unduly harsh character judgments”); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 413, 420 (2007) (“[T]he courts of appeals’ recent comments on the quality of immigration judge 
and BIA opinions and the professional behavior of a few particular immigration judges have been 
prolific and scathing.”). 
223 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001) (stating that precluding judicial review of 
a question of pure law would raise constitutional questions); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 
(2001) (noting that Congress has the “plenary power to create immigration law” but that this power is 
subject to constitutional limitations). 
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detainees. First, the court rejected a rule requiring the government to give 
detainees notice and a hearing thirty days prior to their transfer from 
Guantánamo to a third country, even in cases where detainees fear 
mistreatment or torture upon return.224 The court also ruled that 
Guantánamo detainees could not be released into the United States225 under 
any circumstances, indicating “that the Guantánamo detainees had no due 
process rights,”226 and it issued a sweeping ruling that international law had 
no bearing on the scope of the government’s detention authority.227 These 
rulings show skepticism of the type of judicial interventions epitomized by 
the prior Supreme Court rulings in Hamdi and Boumediene.228 Thus, in 
both national security and immigration, the increased use of individuated 
analyses has not ruled out the possibility of formal, categorical rulings or 
even invocations of Mathews that reduce, if not eliminate, the due process 
rights of foreign nationals challenging executive action. 
Although courts have not applied Mathews to expand the due process 
rights of foreign nationals in all cases,229 they have placed the individuated 
frameworks from Mathews and related cases to a number of important 
ends. In national security, for example, courts have highlighted due process 
norms as a safeguard against lapses in the integrity and procedural 
regularity of executive courts. This qualitative institutional check actually 
has roots in the original Goldberg/Mathews debate itself.230 In 
immigration, by contrast, the Court has used due process analysis to limit 
the severity of numerous statutory reforms, to place limits on the 
executive, and to announce an emerging, if inchoate, individual rights 
doctrine for foreign nationals. Across multiple cases, the due process 
analysis provides insights into questions of institutional design, 
administrative regularity, and the substantive quality of decision-making 
by non-Article III courts.  
A.  Quantitative Versus Qualitative Review in National Security 
Within national security, the due process inquiry, and Mathews in 
                                                                                                                          
224 Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
225 Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 559 U.S. 131 
(2010) (per curiam), reinstated on remand, 605 F.3d 1046, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
226 Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 971 (2011) 
(reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010)). 
227 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
228 See Vladeck, supra note 225, at 977; see also id. at 976 (noting Al-Bihani’s “thinly veiled 
hostility to the very process of common law judicial decisionmaking that has characterized the post-
Boumediene habeas jurisprudence in the D.C. district court”). 
229 Cf. Kent, supra note 78, at 27 (“The constitutional right to access the courts is not yet fully 
universal—extraterritorially, the right might only apply to habeas corpus, and there might be some 
places or persons where it does not reach—but it is getting there.”). 
230 See infra notes 250–54 and accompanying text. 
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particular, has functioned as a way of testing administrative integrity. In 
Hamdi, for instance, Justice O’Connor expressed concern not so much with 
the amount of procedures afforded Hamdi but rather with the quality of 
those procedures.231 The difference is subtle, but it helps explain how, in 
Hamdi and subsequent cases, even minimal procedural protections for 
foreign nationals have proved to be quite constraining for the federal 
government.232 Justice O’Connor, citing Mathews, tried not to subject the 
government to onerous procedural requirements in the executive detention 
context.233 Rather, she noted that the “ongoing military conflict” might 
require vastly curtailed procedures,234 including the use of hearsay 
testimony,235 a rebuttable presumption favoring the government’s 
evidence,236 and/or military tribunals in place of civilian courts.237 Without 
taking a firm position on the precise baseline of guaranteed procedures, the 
Court instead required a modicum of integrity—something only the Court 
could evaluate.238 Turning to the actual evidence supplied by the 
government—a two-page declaration by an army officer with remote 
knowledge of the circumstances of Hamdi’s capture—the Court held that it 
could not, consistent with due process, allow the government to detain 
Hamdi without giving him the opportunity to rebut the proffered 
evidence.239 The Court noted that “[a]ny process in which the Executive’s 
factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct 
without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate 
otherwise falls constitutionally short.”240  
Given the Hamdi plurality’s willingness to allow for abbreviated 
procedural review, its invocation of Mathews is less about guaranteeing a 
certain quantity of procedures and more about ensuring their quality. In 
Boumediene, the Court similarly rejected the adequacy of the review 
mechanisms put in place by Congress to evaluate the legitimacy of the 
executive’s detention hearings at Guantánamo.241 Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion recognized that “the necessary scope of habeas review in 
                                                                                                                          
231 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530–31 (2004). 
232 Notably, the government chose to release Hamdi rather than provide the type of hearing the 
Court required. See Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia: U.S. Citizen’s Detention as Enemy 
Combatant Sparked Fierce Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A2. 
233 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (noting the increased burdens that more elaborate procedural 
safeguards could have on the government during a time of ongoing military conflict).  
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 533–34. 
236 Id. at 534.   
237 Id. at 538. 
238 Id. at 530 (noting a concern with the “interest of the erroneously detained individual”). 
239 Id. at 537–38. 
240 Id. at 537. 
241 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787–92 (2008) (holding that the review mechanisms 
of the Detainee Treatment Act were an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus). 
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part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings,”242 suggesting a 
greater concern with the quality of review than the quantity of procedures. 
Rather than mandate a tribunal system at Guantánamo approximating 
Article III trials, the Court required that the government’s court system 
satisfy basic features of procedural regularity.243 Yet the flaws in the 
detainee review process undermined the Court’s faith in the executive’s 
“process of ascertaining [the] facts”244: the review panels had failed to 
obtain and consider all available evidence, develop the factual record to 
support an ultimate decision on the merits, and apply consistent legal 
principles across the spectrum of similar cases on review.245 Unlike 
criminal proceedings, which include “a judicial hearing before a tribunal 
disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures designed to 
ensure its own independence[, those] dynamics [were] not inherent in 
executive detention orders or executive review procedures” at 
Guantánamo.246 Whether the tribunals, “as currently constituted, satisf[ied] 
due process standards”247 as a quantitative matter was secondary to the 
Court’s qualitative analysis and the Court’s concern with a “considerable 
risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact.”248 Thus, Boumediene, like 
Hamdi, appears to be about quality as much as quantity. On this account, it 
is understandable why the government’s effort to avoid a constitutional 
ruling in Boumediene by simply interpreting then-extant review 
mechanisms more generously was no solution at all.249  
This idea of qualitative review finds support in the original 
Goldberg/Mathews debate. The Goldberg Court cited “the welfare 
bureaucracy’s difficulties in reaching correct decisions on eligibility” as a 
reason to require greater procedural protections at the pre-termination 
stage.250 Mathews, by contrast, pointed to the underlying reliability of 
agency determinations based on “medical sources, such as the treating 
physician,” whose assessments could be “supported by X-rays and the 
                                                                                                                          
242 Id. at 781 (emphasis added).  
243 Id. at 781–82.  
244 Id. at 782 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) 
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). 
245 See Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings: CSRT: The Modern 
Habeas Corpus? 2–3 (Seton Hall Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper No. 951245, 2006), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951245.  
246 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783. 
247 Id. at 785. 
248 Id. 
249 Cf. id. at 787–88 (noting that the Solicitor General, in an effort to save the statute, urged the 
Court to construe the statute to “empower the Court of Appeals to order the applicant . . . released” and 
“to allow petitioners to assert most, if not all, of the legal claims they seek to advance” through that 
process). 
250 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 n.12 (1970). 
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results of clinical or laboratory tests.”251 Skepticism of the integrity of 
welfare bureaucracy rulings, contrasted with optimism in the Social 
Security Agency,252 seemed to lend credence to Mathews’ rejection of a 
pre-termination hearing for recipients of Social Security disability 
benefits.253 Nearly thirty years later, Hamdi and Boumediene similarly 
suggested that the judiciary would stay its hand if it could assume the 
accuracy, trustworthiness, and integrity of administrative decisions. 
However, if that ordinary trustworthiness were to break down, the Court 
would have to use its own superior competence in resetting the proper 
institutional relationships. While the Court has yet to consciously establish 
any particular relationship between the scaling of judicial review and a 
belief in agency competence,254 the concern about the quality of procedural 
review is evident in these recent cases. 
B.  Due Process as a Mechanism of Political Branch Control 
Whereas the national security cases have used due process to require a 
modicum of administrative integrity, immigration decisions have invoked 
due process concerns to place constraints more generally on the political 
branches, especially in response to Congress’s increased efforts in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act255 and the Illegal 
                                                                                                                          
251 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 345 (1976). 
252 Id. at 349 (“[S]ubstantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals 
charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs . . . .”). 
253 Id. According to Richard Pierce,  
[p]olitically accountable legislatures are far better than courts at determining the 
relative social value of the myriad benefits they choose to make available by statute, 
and agencies are far better than courts at performing the difficult empirical work 
required to estimate the costs and benefits of alternative decisionmaking procedures. 
Thus, legislatures and agencies are likely to do a better job of choosing appropriate 
procedures through application of the Eldridge test than courts have done.  
Pierce, supra note 2, at 1999. 
254 Notably, the Court has discussed a relationship between procedural due process and agency 
quality in other post-Mathews domestic-law decisions. For example, in Walters v. National Association 
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985), the Court upheld a statutory ten-dollar limitation on 
attorney fees for cases brought before the United States Veterans Administration, noting that the 
statutory cap did not appear to be an impediment to good decision-making by administrative 
adjudicators. Without evidence indicating that lifting the cap on fees “would reduce the likelihood of 
error in the run-of-the-mine case,” the Court refused to invalidate it. Id. at 330. In Schweiker v. 
McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982), the Court upheld the appointment of hearing officers by insurance 
carriers who resolved disputes between claimants and those carriers over certain supplemental medical 
costs. The Court noted that there was no evidence of bias or a lack of qualifications by hearing 
examiners. Id. at 196. Evidence of such bias, incompetence or frequent mistakes by agency 
adjudicators might warrant additional procedures, but assuming there was no reason to doubt agency 
competence, the procedures in place were deemed legitimate. Id. at 199–200. 
255 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
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Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act256 (IIRIRA) to strip 
judicial review in a number of different immigration cases. The Supreme 
Court has rejected these congressional measures broadening the range of 
deportable offenses,257 narrowing (or eliminating) judicial review of 
numerous deportation matters,258 and eliminating the availability of 
discretionary relief from deportation for several classes of foreign 
nationals.259 
For example, in INS v. St. Cyr,260 the Supreme Court narrowly 
interpreted Section 340(b) of IIRIRA, a provision that eliminated a form of 
relief from deportation for foreign nationals who were found guilty of 
committing certain offenses—aggravated felonies, drug offenses, certain 
weapons or national security violations, or multiple crimes of moral 
turpitude.261 The respondent, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to 
sale of a controlled substance—an aggravated felony—prior to the 
effective date of IIRIRA.262 However, the agency did not initiate 
deportation proceedings until after the law took effect, at which time St. 
Cyr, owing to his plea, apparently was no longer eligible for a 
discretionary wavier of deportation.263  
The Supreme Court’s ruling contained both substantive and procedural 
elements. As a substantive matter, the Court focused on what it believed to 
be St. Cyr’s likely expectation that he would remain eligible for 
immigration relief at the time he agreed to a plea. Because the government 
had “received the benefit of the[] plea agreements,”264 which had “likely 
[been] facilitated by the aliens’ belief in their continued eligibility for . . . 
relief,”265 the Court refused to interpret IIRIRA in a way that would upset 
those expectations. As the Court explained, doing so would be “contrary to 
                                                                                                                          
256 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
257 See 1 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 
§§ 2.04[14][b][vi], [14][c] (2012). 
258 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 22 (5th ed. 2009). 
259 Section 440(d) of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act identified a broad set of 
offenses for which convictions make a foreign national ineligible for discretionary waiver of 
deportation. 110 Stat. at 1277 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)). Section 304-240B(b) of IIRIRA, 110 
Stat. at 3009-597, repealed Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), which bestowed broad discretion upon the Attorney General to grant 
deportation waivers. Section 304(b) also replaced this relief with a more narrow cancellation of 
removal provision, 110 Stat. at 3009-594 (creating 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)). This provision gives the 
Attorney General discretion to cancel removal for only a narrow class of foreign nationals. Id. A 
foreign national convicted of any aggravated felony is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Id. 
260 533 U.S. 289 (2001) 
261 IIRIRA § 304-240A(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-594; St. Cyr, 553 U.S. at 326. 
262 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 323. 
265 Id. 
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‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled 
expectations[.]’”266 Attributing those same reliance interests to the case of 
St. Cyr,267 the Court construed the provision of IIRIRA narrowly and 
refused to apply it to pre-IIRIRA plea agreements.268  
To reach this substantive outcome regarding the petitioner’s 
expectations for immigration relief, the Supreme Court first had to issue a 
procedural ruling regarding a jurisdiction-stripping provision that appeared 
to block habeas access.269 In protecting court access under the general 
habeas corpus statute, the Court noted institutional concerns—in particular, 
a judicial worry regarding Congress’s broader effort to curtail judicial 
review.270 The Court applied both a presumption in favor of judicial review 
in administrative action and a clear statement requirement for habeas 
repeal.271 These more rigorous interpretations of the statute were necessary 
because the legislature’s habeas repeal provision tested “the outer limits of 
Congress’ power”272 and “raise[d] serious constitutional problems.”273 The 
Court ended on the particularly self-confident note that even within 
immigration law, “‘judicial intervention in deportation cases’ is 
unquestionably ‘required by the Constitution.’”274 Congress could not so 
easily eliminate habeas review; to do so would, at the very least, raise 
constitutional questions—a matter that the Court saw itself in a more 
expert position to resolve.275    
Three years after the St. Cyr Court expressed a greater confidence to 
assert a check on Congress, the Supreme Court raised institutional 
concerns about the executive when it considered the maximum length of 
time a foreign national could spend in detention after a final order of 
                                                                                                                          
266 Id. at 323 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)). 
267 Id. at 325 (“Prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA, aliens like St. Cyr had a significant likelihood of 
receiving . . . relief . . . [and] respondent, and other aliens like him, almost certainly relied upon that 
likelihood in deciding whether to forgo their right to a trial . . . .”). 
268 Id. at 325–26. The Court rejected the opinions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the 
legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Attorney General, all of whom interpreted 
IIRIRA to eliminate discretionary waivers of deportation for those who pled guilty prior to the law’s 
taking effect. Id. at 293, 303. 
269 Id. at 298, 314 (rejecting the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s argument that 
jurisdiction to hear St. Cyr’s habeas petition was repealed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act and IIRIRA). 
270 Id. at 298–300, 304–05, 314. 
271 Id. at 298–99 (citing Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (6 Wall.) 85, 102 (1868); Felker v. Turpin, 518 
U.S. 651, 660–61 (1996)). 
272 Id. at 298–99 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988), for the proposition that the Court should not construe a statute to 
test the limits of congressional power unless a clear statement demands that interpretation). 
273 Id. at 299–300 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932), for the proposition that a 
Court should avoid an interpretation of a statute that raises constitutional questions if another, less-
problematic interpretation is “fairly possible”).  
274 Id. at 300 (emphasis added) (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)). 
275 Id.  
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removal. In Zadvydas v. Davis,276 the Court imposed a presumptive six-
month limit on the period during which non-citizens could be held while 
the government effectuated their deportations.277 Relevant statutes 
authorized the federal government to hold a foreign national in detention 
for up to ninety days upon entry of a final order of removal278 and 
permitted additional time for the agency to detain “beyond the removal 
period” in certain specified cases.279 Denying that the “statute means what 
it literally says,”280 the Court offered a direct rebuke to the idea of 
indefinite detention.   
Zadvydas turned specifically on a judicial anxiety with unlimited 
executive discretion. While the Court recognized Congress’s broad powers 
to “remove aliens, to subject them to supervision with conditions . . . or to 
incarcerate them where appropriate for violations of those conditions,”281 it 
prevented the executive from construing the statute in ways that would 
allow for indefinite detention.282 The concern was not about the propriety 
of the exercise of plenary power by one of the political branches; rather, it 
was about the boundaries of those powers altogether.283 Because 
authorizing indefinite detention seemed to exceed those boundaries, the 
Court invoked the constitutional avoidance canon to construe the statute’s 
grant of detention authority as ceasing once removal of the detainee would 
no longer be “reasonably foreseeable.”284 
But the Zadvydas Court was not finished. It also established that 
habeas courts have some power to review executive decisions about 
whether these constitutionally mandated limits have been satisfied.285 
Although the Court recognized that the judiciary ordinarily defers to 
executive judgments in the immigration arena,286 it placed a presumptive 
                                                                                                                          
276 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
277 Id. at 701. 
278 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000).  
279 Id. § 1231(a)(6). 
280 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. 
281 Id. at 695. 
282 Id. at 682 (“Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention . . . would raise serious 
constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ 
limitation . . . .”).   
283 See id. at 696 (“[W]e believe that an alien’s liberty interest is, at the least, strong enough to 
raise a serious question as to whether, irrespective of the procedures used, the Constitution permits 
detention that is indefinite and potentially permanent.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
284 Id. at 699. 
285 See id. (“[T]he habeas court must ask whether the detention in question exceeds a period 
reasonably necessary to secure removal.”). 
286 See id. at 700 (“Ordinary principles of judicial review in this area recognize primary Executive 
Branch responsibility. They counsel judges to give expert agencies decisionmaking leeway in matters 
that invoke their expertise.” (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651–52 
(1990))). 
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six-month limit on detention.287 It also prescribed procedures once the six 
months elapse,288 thus further cabining executive discretion.289 
In 2009, the Court again rebuffed the political branches by refusing to 
let them displace the judicial criteria for granting stays of removal with a 
more demanding rule. In Nken v. Holder,290 the Court interpreted a 
provision of IIRIRA that limited the availability of injunctive relief, which 
the government argued applied to stays of removal as well.291 While the 
case concerned immigration deportation, the Court’s opinion situated the 
remedy at issue within the judicial structure. Rather than defer to 
Congress’s efforts “to allow for more prompt removal,”292 the Court 
recognized judicial stays as a fundamental “part of [the] traditional 
equipment for the administration of justice”293 that is “inherent” to judicial 
power.294 While an injunction acts on a party outside the judiciary, a stay 
“operates upon the judicial proceeding itself.”295 And for the purposes of a 
stay, the Court refused to accord greater deference to an administrative 
ruling, treating the latter just like any lower federal court order.296  
It is against that background that the Court interpreted the statutory 
provision at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2).297 Although its analysis included 
standard textual tools of interpretation,298 the Court also devoted much 
time to describing how a contrary result would impinge on judicial power. 
Applying the statutory standard to stays would subvert the judiciary’s very 
                                                                                                                          
287 Id. at 701. 
288 See id. at 701 (“After [the] 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that 
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must 
respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.”). 
289 However, only two years later in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Court rejected a 
due process challenge to a six-month mandatory detention without the opportunity for a bond hearing. 
538 U.S. 510, 513, 528, 530–31 (2003). It would be an understatement to say that Demore greatly 
complicates Zadvydas, leaving it to lower courts to work out ways of resolving the obvious tensions 
between the two cases. See generally Anello, supra note 72, at 376–83, 390–93 (discussing and 
reconciling tensions between Demore and Zadvydas). 
290 556 U.S. 418 (2009). 
291 Id. at 423, 425, 426. 
292 Id. at 424. 
293 Id. at 421 (quoting Scripps–Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9–10 (1942)). 
294 Id. at 426. 
295 Id. at 428. 
296 See id. at 429 n.* (“[T]he relief sought . . . would simply suspend administrative alteration of 
the status quo, and we have long recognized that such temporary relief from an administrative order—
just like temporary relief from a court order—is considered a stay.”). 
297 The specific statutory language in dispute reads, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this section unless the 
alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as 
a matter of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (2012).   
298 See, e.g., Nken, 556 U.S. at 430 (noting that section 1252(f)(2) did not use the word “stay” but 
Congress did use the term elsewhere in the statute, and “it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in [such] disparate inclusion or exclusion” (quoting INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987))). 
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purpose by requiring an accelerated decision on the merits.299 It would 
likewise prevent courts from taking into consideration potential harm, 
which is one of the animating purposes for which stays are granted.300 
Nken is consistent with a court cognizant of its greater institutional 
competence. Article III courts are well suited to review the exercise of 
discretion by an immigration judge on procedural matters such as motions 
to reopen, and the Court expressed confidence in its own, long-established 
test for stays of removal pending judicial review.301 Indeed, the Court 
adopted a presumption against congressional displacement of those 
factors,302 an approach that is hardly consonant with the broad deference 
characteristic of prior plenary power decisions. Instead of recognizing 
immigration decisions as completely of the political branches, the Court 
treated the immigration agency as it would virtually any other 
administrative body.  
Much of what the Court stated about Congress in Nken it extended to 
the executive two years later in Kucana v. Holder303 when it again 
restricted the immigration agency’s ability to insulate itself from judicial 
scrutiny.304 In Kucana, the Court interpreted a provision of IIRIRA that 
eliminated judicial review of certain immigration decisions.305 The statute, 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), barred review of any action by the attorney 
general or her delegate that was committed to the attorney general’s 
discretion under “this subchapter.”306 Kucana asked whether the bar on 
judicial review also applied to decisions committed to the attorney 
general’s discretion, not by statute, but rather by the executive’s own 
regulations.307 In deciding that the attorney general could not so shield 
agency decisions from judicial review, the Court explicitly cast its decision 
as one of ordinary administrative law.308 It drew on administrative canons 
of construction and expressly cited separation of powers concerns in 
justifying its holding.309 Even aside from the extensive textual and 
                                                                                                                          
299 Id. at 432. 
300 Id. at 432–33.  
301 Id. at 433. 
302 Id. 
303 558 U.S. 233 (2010). 
304 Id. at 252–53. 
305 Id. at 237. 
306 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). 
307 Kucana, 558 U.S. at 237. 
308 Id. (noting the Court’s “longstanding exercise of judicial review of administrative rulings on 
reopening motions,” the “presumption favoring interpretations of statutes [to] allow judicial review of 
administrative action[,]” and a presumption “against reading legislation, absent clear statement, to place 
in executive hands authority to remove cases from the Judiciary’s domain”). 
309 Id.  
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structural analysis of the statute,310 the Court’s invocation of administrative 
law principles to cabin agency deference is important. The Court drew its 
conclusion at least in part from the “basic principle” that “executive 
determinations generally are subject to judicial review,”311 a principle that 
extends to immigration, especially in the context of Article III jurisdiction-
stripping legislation.312  
Though the Court considers these principles well settled, and contends 
that they can only be overcome by a clear legislative statement,313 they are 
not easily reconcilable with a plenary power doctrine that gives the 
political branches unfettered authority to make removal decisions.314 
Rather than casting immigration decisions as exclusively within the realm 
of the political branches, the Court seems to treat them as routine 
administrative law—perhaps with more discretion for the agency than it 
would have under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and 
capricious review315—but with hardly the deference one would expect 
under the plenary power doctrine.   
C.  Due Process as a General Rights Doctrine  
While the preceding cases reflect more of an institutional check on the 
coordinate branches, other recent cases appear squarely concerned with 
advancing the rights of foreign nationals as such. In 2008, for example, the 
Court in Dada v. Mukasey316 again cabined the reach of IIRIRA while 
stressing the importance of protecting the “rights” of foreign nationals.317 
Upon being ordered removed, Dada was granted voluntary departure318—a 
                                                                                                                          
310 See id. at 243–51 (discussing the applicable principles of statutory construction and textual 
analysis). 
311 Id. at 251 (quoting Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995)). 
312 Id. 
313 Id. at 251–52. 
314 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The power of exclusion 
of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States . . . 
cannot be granted away or restrained . . . . Nor can their exercise be hampered . . . by any 
considerations of private interest.”); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of 
Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 
1128 (1995) (“At the heart of the plenary power doctrine lies the belief that Congress and the executive 
branch must have unfettered authority to admit, exclude, or deport aliens.”). 
315 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, finding and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise 
not in accordance with law . . . .”); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (The 
Administrative Procedure Act . . . permits the setting aside of agency action that is ‘arbitrary’ or 
‘capricious.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
316 554 U.S. 1 (2008) 
317 Id.   
318 Id. at 6. Voluntary departure is a discretionary form of relief that allows certain foreign 
nationals to avoid some of the consequences of an order of deportation by departing the country 
willingly. Id. at 8. Section 240B of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides for two types of 
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last-ditch remedy for certain deportable foreign nationals who agree to 
leave on their own accord within a specified period of time.319 Two days 
before expiration of the thirty-day departure period, Dada moved to reopen 
his case so that he could seek an adjustment of status based on evidence 
that he was married to a U.S. citizen.320 The difficulty, however, was that if 
Dada stayed in the United States beyond the thirty-day limit for voluntary 
departures, he would become statutorily ineligible to seek an adjustment of 
status for a period of ten years.321 On the other hand, if he departed the 
United States as required under the voluntary departure provision, he 
would then become ineligible to seek a motion to reopen; under existing 
regulatory interpretation, foreign nationals were ineligible to litigate 
motions to reopen from abroad.322 Thus, according to the Court, Dada was 
left with “two poor choices” in the conflict created by the time limits of the 
voluntary departure provision and the regulation directing the termination 
of motions to reopen upon the foreign national’s departure from the United 
States.323   
The Court stressed the need to preserve the Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s guarantee that “every alien ordered removed from the 
United States has a right to file one motion to reopen his or her removal 
proceedings”324 and that this “right” not “be qualified by the voluntary 
departure process.”325 In an effort to “preserve the alien’s right to pursue 
                                                                                                                          
voluntary departure: (1) voluntary departure before removal proceedings are completed, § 240B(a); and 
(2) voluntary departure after removal proceedings have concluded, § 240B(b). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(a)–
(b) (2012). When voluntary departure is requested before removal proceedings are completed, a foreign 
national must concede removability and waive appeal of all issues. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2014). 
Foreign nationals convicted of an aggravated felony or subject to deportation on national security 
grounds are not eligible for voluntary departure under Section 240B(a). LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, 
supra note 258, at 633. If voluntary departure is granted under Section 240B(a), a foreign national may 
receive up to 120 days to depart. Id. When voluntary departure is requested after the conclusion of 
removal proceedings, a foreign national must meet several requirements: (1) he must have been 
physically present in the United States for at least one year immediately prior to the date of his Notice 
to Appear; (2) he must show good moral character for at least five years prior to his application for 
voluntary departure; and (3) he must show by clear and convincing evidence that he has the means to 
depart and intends to do so. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1). If voluntary departure is granted under § 240B(b), 
the foreign national may receive up to 60 days to depart. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 258, at 
633. 
319 Dada received a thirty-day departure period. Dada, 554 U.S. at 6. 
320 Id. at 6–7. 
321 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(B) (2012); see also Dada, 554 U.S. at 5 (“The alien can remain in the 
United States to ensure the motion to reopen remains pending, while incurring statutory penalties for 
overstaying the voluntary departure date; or the alien can avoid penalties by prompt departure but 
abandon the motion to reopen.”). 
322 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2007) (modified by Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 237, 249 (2010)). 
323 Dada, 554 U.S. at 5. 
324 Id. at 4–5. 
325 Id. at 5. 
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reopening,”326 the Court held that foreign nationals must be permitted to 
unilaterally withdraw a petition for voluntary departure before the 
departure period expires, regardless of the merits of the underlying motion 
to reopen.327 Hence, the Court rejected the agency’s argument that Dada, 
by obtaining permission to voluntarily depart, knowingly forfeited the right 
to pursue a motion to reopen removal proceedings.328 Instead, the Court 
repeatedly referred to the motion to reopen as a “right” that had to be read 
in conjunction with other parts of the Immigration and Nationality Act.329 
It cited prior precedent that recognized “the longstanding principle of 
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the 
alien.”330 
In Negusie v. Holder,331 the Court preserved the availability of asylum 
relief, professing to offer deference to the agency by remanding the matter 
for its reconsideration332 but in effect prioritizing individual fairness over 
agency deference. The Court held that, despite the agency’s contrary 
holding, certain asylum seekers who had persecuted others under duress 
were not necessarily subject to the “persecutor bar” depriving them of 
eligibility for asylum relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals had denied 
Negusie’s application for asylum and withholding of removal because he 
had persecuted others on the basis of their national origin and found no 
“duress exception” in cases where the persecution was extracted through 
coercion.333 The agency reached its conclusion by applying Fedorenko v. 
United States,334 a Supreme Court interpretation of the Displaced Persons 
Act of 1948, which also contained a clause denying relief to those who 
engaged in the persecution of others.335 But the Negusie Court rejected the 
                                                                                                                          
326 Id. at 19. 
327 Id. at 21. 
328 See id. at 16 (“[T]he Government’s position that the alien is not entitled to pursue a motion to 
reopen if the alien agrees to voluntarily depart is unsustainable.”). 
329 Id. at 16 (“In reading a statute we must not ‘look merely to a particular clause,’ but consider 
‘in connection with it the whole statute.’”) (quoting Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1986))); 
see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (“[S]tatutory interpretation turns on ‘the language 
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a 
whole’ . . . .” (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))); Negusie v. Holder, 555 
U.S. 511, 519 (2009) (“[W]e ‘look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the 
statute as a whole and to its object and policy.’” (quoting Dada, 554 U.S. at 16)); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 319–20 (2001) (interpreting the retroactivity of section 304(b) in light of the treatment of 
retroactivity in other sections of IIRIRA). 
330 Dada, 554 U.S. at 19 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)). 
331 555 U.S. 511 (2009). 
332 Id. at 523–24. 
333 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 525. Negusie was granted a limited form of relief under the Convention 
Against Torture, which does not bar to relief for those who have engaged in the persecution or torture 
of others. Id. at 536 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 541–42 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
334 Id. at 542; Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). 
335 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.  
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Board’s analysis and refused to accord Chevron deference to its statutory 
construction.336 The Court remanded the case to the agency to reconsider 
the legal question whether the persecutor bar in the asylum statute 
contained an exception in cases of duress.337 While the Court did not 
explicitly reject the Board of Immigration Appeal’s conclusion as a 
substantive matter, it seemed concerned that the agency’s interpretation 
would prevent bona fide asylum seekers from obtaining relief, 
undermining the Court’s own notion of fairness.338 
Negusie is unusual because the Court’s remand order was based not on 
an unreasonable agency interpretation at Chevron Step Two339 but rather 
on a misapplication of a prior Supreme Court case that “prevented . . . a 
full consideration of the statutory question.”340 Thus, the decision left open 
the possibility that the agency might permissibly re-adopt the very same 
interpretation of the statute—and the Court might reject that one, too.341 
Negusie’s logic seems at odds with ordinary judicial review of agency 
decisions—unless of course the Court is exercising greater control over an 
area of law traditionally governed by plenary powers. As Justice Scalia 
observed in his separate concurrence: “It is to agency officials, not to the 
Members of this Court, that Congress has given discretion to choose 
among permissible interpretations of the statute. They deserve to be told 
clearly whether we are serious about allowing them to exercise that 
discretion, or are rather firing a warning shot across the bow.”342 The 
Negusie majority, rather than adhere strictly to traditional deference norms, 
ensured that the Court would have the final say on whether the agency’s 
interpretation was permissible. 
V.  A MINI-REVOLUTION FOR NON-CITIZENS? 
While it is incontrovertible that the Court’s recent rulings involving 
national security and immigration touch on matters of procedure, they are 
                                                                                                                          
336 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 512. 
337 Id. at 514. 
338 Id. at 517–20 (discussing the problems that lead to enacting the persecutor bar in the Displaced 
Persons Act (at dispute in Fedorenko) and how that differed from the persecutor bar to asylum relief, 
which was enacted under a different statute). 
339 Where statutory meaning is ambiguous, a court at Chevron Step Two considers whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is a “permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  
340 Id. at 521; see also id. (“Whether such an interpretation would be reasonable, and thus owed 
Chevron deference, is a legitimate question; but it is not now before us.”). 
341 See id. at 525 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the “majority appears to leave [the] question 
undecided” but that on his view, “the agency is free to retain that rule so long as the choice to do so is 
soundly reasoned”) (emphasis added).  
342 Id. at 528. 
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hardly decisions of mere housekeeping or internal court operating rules.343 
Boumediene “declared unconstitutional a law enacted by Congress and 
signed by the president on an issue of military policy in a time of armed 
conflict.”344 Hamdi placed limits on presidential powers that it found 
Congress had authorized by restricting the conditions under which the 
President could detain a U.S. citizen enemy combatant.345 St. Cyr and 
Zadvydas set aside congressional statutes meant to drastically reduce the 
procedural and substantive rights of deportable foreign nationals.346 These 
recent Supreme Court rulings within national security and immigration 
engage in deeply substantive interpretations of the Constitution347 as well 
as a host of statutes348 and regulations.349 The cases reveal a Court that is 
increasingly concerned with the individual interests at stake and especially 
willing to intervene to ensure that executive and legislative action not go 
unchecked.  
The cases demonstrate a new unfolding of a legal process regarding 
which branch can appropriately rule on one type of matter or another, and 
they reflect a judicial confidence that is sharply different from the Court’s 
historical role in immigration350 and national security decision-making.351 
                                                                                                                          
343 Martinez, supra note 23, at 1029–32 (describing the Court’s 9/11 decisions as illustrations of 
procedural decision-making in which “little seems to have been decided”
 
because the Court “left the 
final, substantive outcome of the cases at bar uncertain” and that, in the end, the decisions were “less 
like landmarks and more like small signposts directing the traveler to continue toward an eventual, 
more significant fork in the road”). 
344 David Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 
CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2007–2008, at 47, 47–48; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 
(2008).  
345 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521, 533–34 (2004) (“We . . . hold that a citizen-
detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the 
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions 
before a neutral decisionmaker.”). 
346 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293–94, 326 (2001); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 688 
(2001). 
347 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (engaging a substantive analysis of 
the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, including its history, doctrinal interpretations, and application at 
Guantánamo Bay). 
348 See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–83 (2004) (engaging in a detailed analysis of the 
habeas corpus statute, its doctrinal formulations, and its application to Guantánamo Bay). 
349 See, e.g., Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 237 (2010) (holding that a jurisdiction-stripping 
provision of IIRIRA that applied to determinations made discretionary by statute did not limit judicial 
review of determinations made discretionary to the Attorney General through administrative 
regulation). 
350 In the immigration context, Kevin Johnson has noted that the Supreme Court has recently 
issued a string of surprisingly moderate rulings that undermine the core of the plenary power doctrine. 
See Johnson, supra note 16 at 9 (noting, “[w]ith appropriate caution necessitated by the lessons of 
recent history . . . that the Supreme Court’s contemporary immigration decisions suggest that the 
plenary power doctrine, the foundation of immigration exceptionalism, is again headed toward its 
ultimate demise.”). 
351 In the national security context, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have demonstrated how 
courts have used a process-oriented approach that defers to executive action endorsed by Congress. 
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In the wake of the transplantation of the due process revolution to cases 
involving the deportation, detention, and the trial of foreign nationals, 
courts are increasingly willing to evaluate the institutional choices made by 
the coordinate branches. Standard procedural accounts and explanations 
cannot adequately reflect that shift, and efforts to describe these recent 
cases as merely procedural come up short.  
A.  Mathews and the Political Branches  
While the past two decades have generally witnessed incremental 
changes in judicial review, the Supreme Court has placed an individuated 
and multi-pronged framework in the service of a shared expertise among 
the branches where the rights of foreign nationals are concerned. The Court 
has promoted “a dialogue between Congress and the Court”352 and a 
consensus-oriented approach among all three branches—if not a “trilateral” 
endorsement framework.353 Having re-envisioned the possibility of judicial 
competence and an enhanced judicial expertise, the Court is indicating that 
collective decision-making will yield more balanced, coherent, and durable 
national security and immigration policies.  
The shift toward individuated frameworks extends beyond the courts, 
for the coordinate branches, too, are experiencing a Mathewsization of 
sorts. The executive branch has looked to Mathews as the foundational 
framework for assessing policies regarding detention and the use of force. 
A number of recent congressional statutes, while not citing Mathews, also 
adopt a more individuated approach toward immigration policy.  
1.  Individuating National Security: Drones and Detention 
A number of recent executive branch policies reflect a similar trend 
toward applying highly individuated approaches to national security 
decision-making. As Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes have noted, 
                                                                                                                          
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: 
An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 5 (2004) 
(“[C]ourts have sought to shift the responsibility . . . toward the joint action of the most democratic 
branches of the government.”); see also id. at 9–19; Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation 
of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2350 (2006) (“[C]ourts typically have sought to tie 
the constitutionality of presidential action to the requirement of congressional authorization. When 
there is sufficiently broad political agreement that both the legislature and the Executive endorse a 
particular liberty-security tradeoff, the courts have generally accepted that judgment. When the 
Executive has acted without legislative approval, however, the courts have applied close scrutiny and, 
even during wartime, have sometimes invalidated those actions. This process-oriented jurisprudential 
framework, which finds its most eloquent expression in Justice Jackson’s famous concurring opinion in 
Youngstown, dates back at least to the Civil War.”).   
352 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 738. 
353 Cf. Issacharoff & Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism, supra 
note 351, at 27, 33, 35 (discussing collective action between executive and legislative branches—or 
“bilateral endorsement”—as a necessary predicate to judicial validation).   
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government decisions regarding the use of force are undergoing a change 
from an analysis of a person’s status or affiliation with certain groups to an 
individuated inquiry into that particular person’s personal history and 
likely future.354 Where targeted killing and indefinite detention are 
concerned, the military is engaging in quasi-adjudicative decision-making 
processes to determine whether force against an individual is justifiable. 
Given the emergence of stateless enemies without any fixed territorial 
presence, state affiliation, or even physical identifiers (such as wearing 
uniforms or carrying weaponry), it is far more difficult—if not 
impossible—to determine one’s status as an enemy exclusively by virtue of 
group membership. “Attributions of status through group membership 
alone are . . . extremely difficult to establish,” and terrorist suspects are 
now identified by their specific activities.355 Whether and how to use force 
against a potentially hostile person depends less on the individual’s 
categorical membership in, for example, al Qaida, and more on facts 
establishing the individual’s specific guilt. 
Relatedly, the government has internalized Mathews’ individuated 
approach by citing that case as the governing framework for making 
decisions about the limits of using lethal force against U.S. citizen 
members of al Qaida in countries not at war with the United States.356 
According to one DOJ report:   
Were the target of a lethal operation a U.S. citizen who may 
have rights under the Due Process Clause and the Fourth 
Amendment, that individual’s citizenship would not 
immunize him from a lethal operation. Under the traditional 
due process balancing analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, we 
recognize that there is no private interest more weighty than a 
                                                                                                                          
354 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Targeted Warfare: Individuating Enemy 
Responsibility, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1522–23 (2013) (“Whereas the traditional practices and laws 
of war defined ‘the enemy’ in terms of categorical, group-based judgments that turned on status—a 
person was an enemy not because of any specific actions he himself engaged in, but because he was a 
member of an opposing army—we are now moving to a world that implicitly or explicitly requires the 
individuation of enemy responsibility of specific enemy persons before the use of military force is 
considered justified, at least as a moral and political matter.”); see also Gabriella Blum, The 
Individualization of War: From War to Policing in the Regulation of Armed Conflicts, in LAW AND 
WAR 49 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2231168 (“[W]artime 
regulation is increasingly aspiring to make war look more like a policing operation, in which people are 
expected to be treated according to their individual actions rather than as representatives of a 
collective.”). 
355 Issacharoff & Pildes, Targeted Warfare, supra note 354, at 1527. 
356 E.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. 
CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 2, 5–6 
(June 1, 2012), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White 
_Paper.pdf. It should be noted that the White Paper concludes that while U.S. citizen targets such as 
Anwar al-Awlaki may enjoy Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections, the use of lethal force is 
ultimately warranted. Id. at 2.    
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person’s interest in his life. But that interest must be balanced 
against the United States’ interest in forestalling the threat of 
violence and death to other Americans that arises from an 
individual who is a senior operational leader of al-Q’aida or 
an associated force of al-Q’aida and who is engaged in 
plotting against the United States.357   
The DOJ, citing Mathews, ultimately balances the inquiry against the 
individual’s interest, laying bare a weakness reflective of the Hamdi 
plurality’s application of Mathews to a case of indefinite detention of a 
U.S. citizen.358 On the other hand, the executive’s recognition that drone 
targets enjoy some constitutional protections means that “the executive 
believes that the Constitution places important limitations on its ability to 
target U.S. citizens, even when they are enemy fighters in hostile or 
ungoverned territory.”359  
Moreover, just as Boumediene applied the Mathews/Hamdi framework 
to foreign-national enemy combatants, the same executive branch policies 
derived from Mathews appear to apply to non-citizen targets.360 In the case 
of both citizen and non-citizen enemies, “institutional design and operating 
rules of the national security state [have] relax[ed] their traditional 
distinctions between foreign and domestic, enemy and friend, U.S. person 
and not.”361 In that sense, Mathews appears to be forming a new baseline 
for constitutional rights within both the executive and judicial branches, 
where both citizens and non-citizens are concerned.362 
2.  Individuating Immigration 
Individuated assessments are also found within a number of different 
federal immigration statutes that grant relief according to particularized 
                                                                                                                          
357 Id. at 2. 
358 See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
359 Kent, supra note 78, at 19. 
360 See id. (“[T]he executive has suggested that it will follow with regard to noncitizen targets the 
same or similar procedural rules that it says the Constitution requires for U.S. citizens”); see also 
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President at National Defense University (May 
23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-
national-defense-university (“Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al Qaeda and its associated 
forces. And even then, the use of drones is heavily constrained. America does not take strikes when we 
have the ability to capture individual terrorists; our preference is always to detain, interrogate, and 
prosecute. America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations 
with partners, and respect for state sovereignty. . . . [W]e act against terrorists who pose a continuing 
and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of 
effectively addressing the threat. And before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no 
civilians will be killed or injured—the highest standard we can set.”). 
361 Kent, supra note 78, at 14. 
362 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733, 771 (2008) (applying the Hamdi standard 
(including its reliance on Mathews) to cases brought by foreign-national terrorist suspects at 
Guantánamo Bay). 
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assessments of individual merit and a balancing of the equities. The 
Immigration and Naturalization Act provides a number of such provisions. 
Perhaps the most well known example occurs in the case of cancellation-
of-removal relief for non-lawful permanent residents, who must 
demonstrate that their removal from the United States would cause an 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a spouse, parent, or child 
who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.363 Immigration statutes 
also call for individualized analyses in the context of waivers of 
inadmissibility for unlawful presence,364 criminal activity,365 or prior 
misrepresentations.366 
Some scholars have argued that prosecutorial discretion in immigration 
further illustrates the use of individuated approaches in policymaking.367 
Prosecutorial discretion has received great attention in the wake of the 
Obama Administration’s decision to make enhanced use of this important 
tool.368 In a series of memoranda, the immigration agencies have directed 
lower-level agency officials to consider granting favorable exercises of 
discretion in a host of cases that raise positive equities.369 These policy 
memoranda, which apply and expand prosecutorial discretion policies 
                                                                                                                          
363 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2012). Upon making such a showing, the individual is granted an 
adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident. Id. § 1229b(b)(1). 
364 E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (2012) (providing a waiver of inadmissibility due to 
unlawful presence in the United States to prevent “extreme hardship” to the U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident spouse or parent of the foreign national). 
365 E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (providing, subject to a few exceptions, a waiver of 
inadmissibility due to various types of criminal activity to prevent “extreme hardship” to the qualifying 
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident relative of the foreign national). 
366 E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (2012) (providing a waiver of inadmissibility due to misrepresentation 
to prevent “extreme hardship” to the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse of the foreign 
national). 
367 Fatma E. Marouf, Regrouping America: Immigration Policies and the Reduction of Prejudice, 
15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 129, 132 (2012) (“[I]mmigration policies in recent decades have generally 
promoted collective anonymity and depersonalization of undocumented immigrants, but recent policy 
changes encouraging prosecutorial discretion represent a shift towards greater individuation and a first 
step towards decategorization.”). 
368 Prosecutorial discretion concerns decisions by immigration officials not to assert the full scope 
of their enforcement powers in an individual case or category of cases. Memorandum from John 
Morton, Dir., Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to All Field Office 
Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, ICE, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of 
the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 2 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter 
Morton Memo], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-
discretion-memo.pdf (defining prosecutorial discretion as the decision “not to assert the full scope of 
the enforcement authority available to the agency in a given case”).   
369 On June 17, 2011, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director John Morton issued a 
memorandum that specifically authorized immigration field officers to use prosecutorial discretion and 
provided them with several criteria to guide their decision of whether to grant a favorable exercise of 
discretion in a particular case. Id. at 1. These included, inter alia, a foreign national’s “ties and 
contributions to the community, including family relationships,” and “whether the person has a U.S. 
citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or parent.” Id. at 4. 
 2015] DUE PROCESS AND THE NON-CITIZEN 931 
under previous presidential administrations,370 recognize that many foreign 
nationals within the country illegally are otherwise law-abiding individuals 
with significant ties to family members, civic and religious organizations, 
corporations, and other institutions within the United States.371 In that 
regard, immigration scholars have discussed how these policies treat 
“membership in U.S. society [as] a matter of degree, rather than an in/out 
dichotomy” and “blur[] rather than brighten[] the line between ‘legal’ and 
‘illegal’ status.”372 Although a favorable exercise of discretion does not 
actually confer a change in one’s status, it reflects a sense that some kinds 
of immigration violations (such as civil infractions) should be 
distinguished from others (such as criminal conduct). Regardless, 
prosecutorial discretion policies “demand[] personalization of the process 
through consideration of individual equities.”373 
On the other hand, the Obama Administration’s renewed attention to 
prosecutorial discretion—in particular, its Deferred Action for Parental 
Accountability374 and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals375 policies, 
                                                                                                                          
370 E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., FACT SHEET ON 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION GUIDELINES (2000), available at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/ 
reference/additional-materials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice/government-
documents/c_6-27DOJ2000ProsDiscretionGuideOVW3-31-09.pdf; Memorandum from Doris 
Meissner, Comm’r of Immigration & Naturalization Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Reg’l Dirs., District 
Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, Reg’l and Dist. Counsel (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://niwaplibrary 
.wcl.american.edu/reference/additional-materials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-
justice/government-documents/22092970-INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-
Meissner-11-7-00.pdf/at_download/file; see also Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: 
Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
105, 107 (2014) (suggesting that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy is consistent with 
presidential power to aid intending Americans threatened with harm by nonfederal sovereigns, such as 
states with restrictive immigration laws).  
371 See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244–45 (2010) (discussing the two-fold purpose of using prosecutorial 
discretion to conserve resources and promote humanitarian concerns); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. 
REV. 1, 12–13 (2012) (listing the humanitarian factors considered when officials grant favorable 
exercises of discretion). 
372 Marouf, supra note 367, at 153. 
373 Id. 
374 This program, announced on November 20, 2014, allows parents of U.S. citizens and lawful 
permanent residents who have been present in the country since January 1, 2010, and who meet certain 
criteria, to request deferred action and employment authorization for three years. See Executive Actions 
on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIG. SERVICES (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov 
/immigrationaction. 
375 This program, announced on June 15, 2012 and expanded on November 22, 2014, defers 
action for certain young people who came to the United States as children.  Memorandum from Janet 
Napolitano, Sec’y Homeland Sec., to the Acting Comm’r of U.S. Customs & Border Prot., the Dir. Of 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., and Dir. ICE 1 (June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-
as-children.pdf. Under the first iteration of this policy, young foreign nationals who meet certain 
requirements could seek a renewable deferred action status for two years. Id. at 2–3. On November 20, 
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which provide agency-wide, albeit temporary, relief for many 
undocumented foreign nationals—arguably tacks away from an 
individuated analysis toward a categorical approach. These deferred action 
policies, not unlike other forms of across-the-board uses of administrative 
discretion, declare entire categories of foreign nationals to be prima facie 
eligible for deferred action. Of course, eligible foreign nationals must still 
apply for and be approved under the specified criteria for each respective 
deferred action program;376 thus, these policies arguably require some form 
of individuated analysis as well.377    
B.  Individuation and Inter-Branch Coordination 
As courts have examined not just procedural fairness questions but 
also issues of agency and quasi-agency integrity and regularity, they have 
placed multi-pronged and open-textured frameworks such as Mathews in 
the service of more rule-of-law and human-rights-oriented outcomes. This 
assertion of institutional expertise appears unexpected because Mathews, to 
most scholars, reflects judicial restraint—not activism.378 However, the 
transplantation of Mathews to immigration and national security, and the 
case law decided subsequently, reveals a different style of judicial 
reasoning on sensitive matters of policy. Recent cases demonstrate the idea 
of a legal process centered on institutional competence within certain limits 
while extending the boundaries of judicial competence to new areas.379 
Unlike earlier models of legal process couched in limited judicial 
expertise,380 recent invocations of Mathews reveal a body of cases 
                                                                                                                          
2014, the Obama Administration expanded the population eligible for DACA and extended the 
deferred action and work authorization period from two years to three years.  
376 See Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 374 (noting that applicants for deferred 
action are considered on a case-by-case basis and that successful applicants must not be an enforcement 
priority, which includes posing a threat to national security or public safety). 
377 Morton Memo, supra note 368, at 4 (“ICE officers, agents, and attorneys should always 
consider prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-case basis. The decisions should be based on the totality 
of the circumstances, with the goal of conforming to ICE’s enforcement priorities.”). 
378 E.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 
1314 (1986) (arguing that Mathews v. Eldridge “provides further evidence of a wide-ranging shift 
towards greater judicial restraint”); see also supra notes 2, 3, and 50 and accompanying text. 
379 See Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and 
the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1996) (discussing the concept of 
institutional competence and judicial review).  
380 Legal Process has historically focused on procedural institutional discretion—something that 
was derived from the competence of an institution within its own domain—and thus has claimed 
allegiance to a theory based in “neutral principles” without reference to substantive law—satisfying 
realist complaints about political influence on judicial decision-making. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford 
Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 170–71 
(2006) (“[P]roceduralism became the favored response to what some considered the ‘nihilism’ of legal 
realism.”). For Legal Process theorists, “the particular result in a given case was far less important than 
the analytical tools used to justify the result.” Ronald J. Krotoszynsk, Jr., The New Legal Process:  
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reflecting a more involved judiciary. Immigration and national security 
decisions emphasize, perhaps unexpectedly, a deeper relationship between 
concepts such as due process and the values of reason, justice, and 
procedural regularity that are common to the rule of law.  
Moreover, Mathews appears part of a larger dialogue among the 
coordinate branches that avoids the types of fractious power grabs often 
associated with decision-making in these complex arenas. Rather than 
simply overruling the political branches outright, the judiciary has used 
due process as part of a broader incrementalist strategy and a mechanism 
for conversation regarding policy decisions. In that sense, one can 
understand the judiciary’s use of Mathews as consistent with its application 
of Chevron and Youngstown381—as well as other procedural devices382—to 
bring the coordinate branches to some kind of agreement where the border 
and national security are concerned. 
While a full account of the relationship between open-textured 
frameworks, judicial review, and legal process will be saved for future 
work, it is important to highlight how the judiciary’s application of 
individuated approaches to immigration and national security cuts against 
the grain of realist accounts of judicial review over exceptional areas of 
law. Adrian Vermeule, for example, rejects the idea that open-textured 
tests of administrative law can enhance the rule of law, at least where 
national security is concerned.383 He argues that administrative-law 
frameworks tend to be at best a weak form of protection for the rights of 
foreign nationals.384 Because of institutional realities, such as the size and 
scope of the administrative state385 and lawmakers’ inability to perfectly 
                                                                                                                          
Games People Play and the Quest for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 
993 (1999). On the legal process account, the judiciary could legislate through the grant of power 
inherent in the common law and the Constitution, but otherwise only decide discrete cases through 
reasoned argument. Id. 
381 See Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown: National Security and the Administrative 
State, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917, 1977 (2012) (noting that “recent national security decisions have been 
catalytic rather than preclusive, promoting clash, conversation, and dialogue within the political 
branches” and that “[t]hose decisions are remarkably consistent with the development of deference 
doctrines in the ordinary administrative law context, pointing to a vital interplay between the national 
security and domestic cases that highlights the vitality of inter-branch solutions to questions in both 
legal domains”). 
382 See Landau, Muscular Procedure, supra note 65, at 700 (noting how judicial invocation of 
procedural law has sparked a “dialogue in the service of prompting substantive reform where the 
political branches already appear to have agreed on an untenable course of action”). 
383 See generally Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1112–13 (discussing national security and military 
exceptions to the Administrative Procedure Act’s coverage). 
384 See Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1112–13 (discussing examples of how the application of the 
Administrative Procedure Act has provided weak protections for foreign nationals). 
385 Id. at 1134 (“[A]djustable parameters . . . are the lawmakers’ pragmatic response to the sheer 
size of the administrative state, the heterogeneity of the bodies covered by the APA, the complexity and 
diversity of the problems that agencies face . . . .”). 
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predict when future emergencies will arise and what those emergencies 
will be,386 statutes and legal standards must be flexible. But that flexibility 
will inevitably preclude review altogether in certain situations and, in 
others, allow courts to make judicial review a mere façade.387 According to 
Vermeule, courts interpret these “adjustable parameters” by “dialing 
down” review—at least in national security cases—such that judicial 
review becomes more apparent than real. Vermeule flat-out rejects the 
possibility “that executive action arising from war or emergency should be 
governed by ‘ordinary’ administrative law, as opposed to some 
extraordinary law applicable during emergencies.”388  
Unlike the new and invigorated form of legal process reflective of 
current Supreme Court decisions,389 Vermeule’s argument appears to 
follow a realist methodology390 by posing a testable hypothesis regarding 
the open-ended parameters of administrative law and then demonstrating 
the truth of that hypothesis.391 And it reflects the realist sensibility that any 
appearance of reasoning apolitically and deductively from abstract 
principles to concrete rules is illusory392 and that the personality of the 
judge, rather, must play some role in the outcome.393  
National security law post-9/11 has been a fertile area for this type of 
neo-realist investigation. The Supreme Court has long held that courts 
ought to generally defer to the executive on matters of national security,394 
                                                                                                                          
386 Id.  
387 Id. at 1136. 
388 Id. at 1102. 
389 Cf. Abebe & Posner, supra note 9, at 508 (“The conflict with al Qaeda has generated . . . some 
cases that reflect a new legalist sensibility in tension with the old commitment to executive primacy.”). 
390 A number of commentators have associated Vermeule’s work with legal realism. See, e.g., 
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt 
a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 103 (2009) (“Vermeule provides a highly sophisticated 
version of formalism, which gestures toward new realism. . . .”); see also Benjamin Kleinerman, Book 
Review, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic, 90 TEX. L. REV. 943, 946 (2012) (“In 
a certain sense, Posner and Vermeule exemplify an endemic feature of the school of legal realism from 
which they emerge.”).  
391 Legal Realists rejected the idea that law could be separated from politics and disputed the 
formalist aspiration toward “an autonomous and self-executing system of legal discourse.” See 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 193 (1992); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story: Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 693 (1989) (“According to the legal realists, 
adjudication was not, and could never be, wholly mechanical and apolitical.”). 
392 See HORWITZ, supra note 391, at 200; see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New 
Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 832 (2008) (“[Realists] believed that, much of the time, 
existing law did not compel particular outcomes, in the sense that the available sources would not 
require a rational and fair-minded judge to reach only one result.”).   
393 See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 392, at 832 (discussing the impact of the personalities of 
judges on case outcomes). 
394 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (finding some 
“plenary” executive powers in foreign relations). 
 2015] DUE PROCESS AND THE NON-CITIZEN 935 
and scholars have sought to quantify whether, when, and to what extent 
courts have in fact adopted a regime of deference to the executive post-
9/11. These investigations have looked at, inter alia, invalidation rates, 
party affiliation, panel effects,395 the long-term impact of wartime 
jurisprudence on rights protections,396 and the types of remedies courts 
have issued in the national security context.397 Despite this attention, 
empirical, data-driven accounts of judicial behavior in the modern national 
security context have been rare; discussion has largely centered on 
normative questions.398 Applied to national security, the realist inquiry 
tends to take the position that courts should increase their deference to 
executive decision-making during crises.399 
Yet the Supreme Court’s twenty-first century decisions—from St. Cyr 
through Kucana and from Rasul through Boumediene—provide an 
important counterweight to the realist thesis. Across all of these cases, the 
Court refused to dial down its review, despite the government’s 
protestations,400 and asserted a larger role in resolving questions regarding 
the rights of foreign nationals in the immigration and national security 
contexts. The Court’s habeas rulings strike at the very heart of plenary 
political branch powers doctrine by construing the reach of the habeas writ 
very broadly, even if the scope of their review is arguably narrow. In both 
the national security and immigration contexts, courts have engaged in a 
creative process of interpretation to bring statutory provisions in line with 
broader notions of rationality and justice.401 Cases such as St. Cyr, 
Zadvydas, Hamdan, and Boumediene speak of a conversation with the 
political branches in which coordinate institutions have overlapping areas 
of expertise relevant to national security and immigration matters. This 
                                                                                                                          
395 Cass Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation, 2008 SUP. 
CT. REV. 269, 269. 
396 Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005). 
397 Aziz. Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 234–35. 
398 Id. at 225. See generally Abebe & Posner, supra note 9 (laying out the normative case for 
executive primary in foreign affairs). 
399 See Abebe & Posner, supra note 9, at 547–48. 
400 The government’s brief in both cases urged deference to the executive branch prerogative. In 
St. Cyr, the government rejected the premise that “the Great Writ requires a judicial forum for an alien 
to present the claim that he has a ‘right’ to be considered for an exercise of a power that Congress has 
placed in the discretion of the Attorney General to dispense with the deportation of an alien.” See Brief 
for Petitioner at 27, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (No. 00-767). The government argued that its 
discretion in such cases was “unfettered,” precluding the judiciary from exercising any role. Id. at 28. 
The government argued similarly in Rasul that Guantánamo Bay was a veritable legal black hole 
beyond the Court’s power. Brief for Respondents at 13–14, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 
03-334, 03-343). 
401 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpretation of Statutes, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 200, 206 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (discussing, in the context of 
legislation theory, a version of “process progressivism” defined by “creative law-making by courts and 
agencies . . . to ensure rationality and justice in law”). 
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reflects a vision more akin to legal process, which stresses “the importance 
of dialogue or conversation as the means by which innovative lawmaking 
can be validated in a democratic polity and by which the rule of law can 
best be defended against charges of unfairness or illegitimacy.”402 While 
the unfolding of that process is still taking shape, the convergence toward 
individuated analyses highlights the possibility of a shared approach 
among the collective branches that could pave the way toward more 
durable immigration and national security policies in the future. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Mathewsization of immigration and national security may be a 
way station between the constraining exceptionalist doctrines of the past 
and the law of the future. Nevertheless, Mathews’ transplantation has 
brought important changes to the formal inquiries that generally made it 
impossible to take the rights of foreign nationals seriously. The judiciary’s 
individuated approach, and its enhanced competence vis-à-vis the political 
branches, arguably exemplifies a new phase in the due process revolution 
and the start of a renewed intersection among the collective branches, 
leading to stronger interbranch partnerships in the collective shaping of 
subsequent policies.    
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